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SHORTCOMINGS AND SOLUTIONS: REFORMING 
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS 
FRAMEWORK IN THE WAKE OF THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON DISASTER 
Andrew Hartsig* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion rocked the BP Deepwater Horizon 
offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.1  The explosion and resulting 
fire killed eleven crew members, seriously injured sixteen others, and 
eventually sank the rig.2  The explosion also marked the beginning of the 
“world’s largest accidental release of oil into marine waters.”3  By the 
time BP effectively stopped the flow of oil on July 15, its Macondo well 
had discharged approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil.4  The Deepwater 
Horizon disaster was a human and environmental tragedy, and it may 
take years to assess the full scope of the damage to the people, 
economies, and ecosystems of the Gulf region. 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed systemic weaknesses in 
the administration of oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf 
                                            
 * Arctic Program Director for Ocean Conservancy, a national marine conservation 
organization. 
 1. BOB GRAHAM & WILLIAM K. REILLY, Foreword to NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF 
OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, at  vi  (2011). 
 2. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING 55 (2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION].  
 3. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, 
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html. 
 4. Id.; see also JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? available at 
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/posted/2931/Oil_Budget_
description_8_3_FINAL.844091.pdf. 
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(OCS).5  It also underscored the difficulty of stopping and responding to 
a major oil spill, even in the relatively accessible and temperate waters of 
the Gulf of Mexico.   
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling (National Commission)—a bipartisan commission 
created by the President and charged with investigating the disaster and 
developing options for improving offshore oil and gas practices6—
identified a series of “weaknesses and . . . inadequacies” in the federal 
government’s oversight of OCS oil and gas activities.7  The National 
Commission found that these shortcomings affected the full spectrum of 
OCS activities, from planning for OCS oil and gas lease sales, to 
administering offshore exploration and development activities, to 
planning and implementing oil spill response efforts.8  The National 
Commission recommended a broad “overhaul” of “the regulatory 
policies and institutions used to oversee offshore activities to address 
these problems.”9 
This Article discusses the existing framework for federal oversight of 
OCS oil and gas activities—including oil spill preparation and response, 
and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act10 (NEPA)—
and recommends policy and legislative solutions to address the flaws in 
that framework.  Section II provides an overview of the existing 
statutory, regulatory, and policy structures that govern oil and gas 
activities, oil spill preparedness, and response on the OCS.  Section III 
reviews some of the initial investigations and administrative and 
legislative actions that occurred in response to the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.  Section IV identifies and discusses some of the critical 
shortcomings that remain, and suggests reforms necessary to make OCS 
oil and gas operations safer and more environmentally responsible.  
Finally, Section V examines what may be the next frontier—expanded 
oil and gas operations in OCS waters off Alaska’s North Slope—and 
                                            
 5. The Outer Continental Shelf is defined as “all submerged lands lying seaward and 
outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in [43 U.S.C. § 1301] . . . 
and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”  43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2006).   
 6. Exec. Order  No. 13543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397. 29, 397 (May 26, 2010). 
 7. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at ix. 
 8. See generally id. at 249-91 (identifying problems and recommending options for 
improving government administration and oversight of OCS oil and gas and spill 
response activities). 
 9. Id. at 250.  
 10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (as 
amended by Pub. L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 729 (March 11, 2009)). 
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recommends additional measures necessary to protect vulnerable Arctic 
ecosystems. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING OCS OIL AND 
GAS ACTIVITIES AND OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
Oil and gas activities on the OCS are controlled by a patchwork of 
statutes, regulations, and policies.   The OCS Lands Act11 (OCSLA) is 
the principal statute governing offshore oil and gas activity in federal 
waters.  It establishes a multiple-stage framework that provides for oil 
and gas planning, leasing, exploration, and development and production 
on the OCS.  The Oil Pollution Act of 199012 (OPA 90)—including 
certain amendments to the Clean Water Act13—sets forth additional 
requirements that govern planning and response related to oil spills in 
marine waters.  And as federal agencies plan for and decide whether to 
approve OCS oil and gas activities, they often trigger the requirements of 
NEPA.  In addition to OCSLA, OPA 90, and NEPA, OCS oil and gas 
activities may implicate a variety of other federal laws, including but not 
limited to the Clean Air Act14, the Marine Mammal Protection Act15 
(MMPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act16 (CZMA), the Endangered 
Species Act17 (ESA), and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act18 (MSA).   This Section discusses the OCSLA 
framework for OCS development, specific portions of OPA 90 and the 
Clean Water Act that pertain to oil spill preparedness and response, and 
key provisions of NEPA as they relate to federal decision-making about 
offshore oil and gas activities.  It also notes briefly the ways in which 
OCS oil and gas activities may trigger the requirements of other federal 
environmental laws.  
                                            
 11. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006). 
 12. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006). 
 13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). 
 14. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). 
 15. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h (2006). 
 16. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
 17. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
 18. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1801-1891d (2006). 
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A.  The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
OCSLA was enacted in 195319 and amended significantly in 1978.20  
Among other things, OCSLA established a national policy with respect 
to the OCS.21  Congress declared that the OCS “should be made available 
for expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental 
safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of 
competition and other national needs.”22  To that end, Congress gave the 
Secretary of the Interior the authority to lease areas of the OCS to private 
industry for oil and gas exploration and development.23   
1.  Administration of OCSLA within the Department of the Interior 
Since 1982, the Secretary of the Interior has delegated much of his or 
her authority under OCSLA to the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI).24  MMS 
promulgated binding regulations that provide additional detail regarding 
the implementation of OCSLA.25  MMS, however, was not an effective 
agency.  Even before the Deepwater Horizon blowout, an Office of 
Inspector General investigation of one MMS program “revealed an 
organizational culture lacking acceptance of government ethical 
standards, inappropriate personal behaviors, and a program without the 
necessary internal controls in place to prevent future unethical or 
unlawful behavior.”26  As the National Commission observed, “[p]erhaps 
because of the cumulative lack of adequate resources, absence of a 
sustained agency mission, or sheer erosion of professional culture within 
some offices, MMS came progressively to suffer from serious 
                                            
 19. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified 
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006)).   
 20. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 
(1978) Congress has enacted more limited amendments to OCSLA several times since 
1978.  See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 
(1986). 
 21. 43 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 22. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3). 
 23. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to administer 
the provisions of OCSLA relating to the leasing of the Outer Continental Shelf). 
 24. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 56 (describing the creation of MMS 
by then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt in 1982). 
 25. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. pts. 250, 251, 260 (2010). 
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: 
MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP–LAKEWOOD 1 (2008), available at http://www.doioig.gov/ 
images/stories/reports/pdf//RIKinvestigation.pdf. 
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deficiencies of organization and management.”27  These deficiencies 
were laid bare in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
As described in more detail in Section III(B) below, Secretary of the 
Interior Ken Salazar made sweeping changes to DOI in the wake of the 
disaster.  As a result of these changes, MMS was abolished and replaced 
by a transitional agency called the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE).28  When 
Secretary Salazar’s reorganization program is complete in October 2011, 
MMS’s responsibilities will be divided among three separate 
administrative entities operating within DOI: the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue 
(ONRR).29  For consistency and to avoid confusion, this Article will in 
most instances refer to the agency tasked with managing DOI’s OCS oil 
and gas responsibilities as “BOEM.” 
Regardless of its name, the agency that regulates OCS oil and gas 
operations must implement the provisions of OCSLA.  OCSLA 
establishes a four-stage process for OCS leasing and development: (1) 
development of a five-year OCS oil and gas leasing program, (2) OCS 
lease sales, (3) exploration, and (4) development and production.  The 
paragraphs below describe these stages in more detail. 
2.  Five-year OCS leasing program  
At the first stage of the OCSLA process, the Secretary of the Interior 
must prepare a five-year oil and gas leasing program.  “The leasing 
program shall consist of a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, as 
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity 
which . . . will best meet national energy needs for the five-year period 
following its approval or reapproval.”30  OCSLA instructs the Secretary 
to “select the timing and location of leasing, to the maximum extent 
practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance between the potential for 
                                            
 27. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 78. 
 28. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,302: CHANGE OF THE NAME OF THE 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, 
REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT (June 18, 2010). 
 29. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,299: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU OF 
OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May 19, 2010); see 
also Press Release, BOEM, Salazar, Bromwich Announce Next Steps in Overhaul of 
Offshore Energy Oversight and Management (Jan. 19, 2011). 
 30. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).  
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environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and 
the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”31    
In crafting the leasing program, OCSLA requires the Secretary to 
adhere to certain principles.  For example, the Secretary must consider 
“economic, social, and environmental values . . . and the potential impact 
of oil and gas exploration on other resource values . . . and the marine, 
coastal, and human environments.”32  When determining the timing and 
location of lease sales, the Secretary must consider a variety of factors, 
ranging from industry’s level of interest to the relative environmental 
sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the OCS.33  
The Secretary must “invite and consider suggestions” on the leasing 
program from interested federal agencies and from the governor of states 
that may be affected by the program.34  BOEM regulations require the 
agency to invite and consider public comment from “all interested 
parties, including the general public.”35  Before approving a leasing 
program, the Secretary must submit the program, together with any 
comments received, to the President and Congress.36   
The Secretary must review an approved five-year program at least 
once a year.37   The Secretary may revise or reapprove the leasing 
program at any time; any significant revision, however, triggers the 
procedural requirements that are prescribed for the promulgation of a 
new leasing program.38  If an area of the OCS is not included in the 
Secretary’s five-year leasing program, that area cannot be leased unless 
the Secretary amends the program to include the missing area.39  If an 
area of the OCS is included in the leasing program, that area may be 
included in a future OCS lease sale, but the Secretary is not obligated to 
lease the area. 
                                            
 31. Id. § 1344(a)(3). 
 32. Id. § 1344(a)(1). 
 33. Id. § 1344(a)(2).   
 34. Id. § 1344(c)(1). 
 35. 30 C.F.R. § 256.16(a) (2010); see also 30 C.F.R. § 256.17(b) (“Comments and 
recommendations on any aspect of the proposed program may be submitted by a State or 
local government or other persons to the Secretary within 90 days after the date of its 
publication in the Federal Register.”).   
 36. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2).   
 37. Id. § 1344(e).   
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. § 1344(d)(3). 
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3.  OCS Lease Sales 
At the second stage of the OCSLA process, the Secretary of the 
Interior determines which OCS tracts to lease, and conducts a 
competitive lease sale to auction OCS oil and gas leases to the highest 
responsible bidder.40  To begin, the director of the leasing agency 
recommends to the Secretary of the Interior areas identified for 
environmental analysis and consideration for leasing.41  In doing so, the 
director must consult with other federal agencies and consider 
“environmental information, multiple-use conflicts, resource potential, 
industry interest and other relevant information.”42  The director must 
also consider comments from “[s]tates and local governments and 
interested parties in response to calls for information and nominations.”43  
It is not uncommon for OCS lease sales to encompass millions or tens of 
millions of acres.44 
After approving a notice of proposed lease sale, the Secretary of the 
Interior must publish it in the Federal Register, send the notice to 
governors of affected states, and respond to input from the affected 
governors.45  At the auction, companies bid to purchase OCS leases 
pursuant to bidding requirements established by OCSLA and its 
implementing regulations.46  OCS leases may contain stipulations and 
conditions developed to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.47  In 
                                            
 40. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (authorizing the Secretary to grant OCS leases). 
 41. 30 C.F.R. § 256.26(a) (2010).   
 42. Id.   
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE SALES 
(2011), available at  http://alaska.boemre.gov/lease/hlease/ 
LeasingTables/lease_sales.pdf (showing that in recent lease sales in the Arctic OCS, 
BOEM offered for lease nearly 30 million acres in lease sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea in 
2008, about 8.7 million acres in lease sale 202 in the Beaufort Sea in 2007, and about 9.3 
million acres in lease sale 195 in the Beaufort Sea in 2005); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 
GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION, GULF OF MEXICO OIL & GAS LEASE OFFERINGS (undated), 
available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/swiler/Table_2. PDF (showing 
that since the early to mid-1980s, most OCS lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region 
have offered at least 20 million acres, and lease sale seventy-nine in 1984 offered more 
than 50 million acres).  
 45. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2006); 30 C.F.R. §§ 256.29(c), 256.31(b) & (c). 
 46. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1337; see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 256.32(b)–(e), 256.35–.47 
(2010). 
 47. 30 C.F.R. § 256.29(a).  In addition to environmental stipulations and conditions, 
leases contain other limits.  For example, the initial lease period is set between five and 
ten years, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2); leases must provide for suspension or cancellation of 
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general, however, a successful bidder gains the right “to explore, develop 
and produce the oil and gas within the lease area, conditioned on due 
diligence requirements and the approval of . . . [a] development and 
production plan.”48 
4.  Exploration  
At the third stage, lease operators may apply to explore their leases, 
usually by drilling one or more exploratory wells.49  Before conducting 
exploration drilling, an operator must submit an exploration plan for the 
Secretary of the Interior’s approval.50   
An exploration plan may encompass multiple leases in one OCS 
region.51  It must include information about the proposed exploratory 
activities, including an anticipated schedule, a description of equipment, 
and “the general location of each well.”52  A plan must also demonstrate 
that exploration activities will conform to relevant laws and regulations, 
will be safe, will protect the rights of the lessor, will not unreasonably 
interfere with other OCS uses, and will not cause undue damage to the 
environment.53  BOEM regulations spell out in some detail the required 
contents of OCS exploration plans.54 
Once an operator submits an exploration plan to BOEM, the agency 
has up to fifteen days to determine whether the plan is “deemed 
                                                                                                  
the lease, id. § 1337(b)(5), (6); and leases may also be cancelled at any time if obtained 
by fraud or misrepresentation.  Id. § 1337(o). 
 48. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4). 
 49. Instead of or in addition to drilling exploration wells, operators may seek to gain 
information about OCS areas through the use of seismic testing or other activities.  
BOEM considers these activities in a process separate from the exploration plan process.  
See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. pt. 251 (setting forth regulations governing geological and 
geophysical exploration on the OCS, including seismic marine surveys). 
 50. Id. § 1340(b), (c); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a). 
 51. 43 U.S.C. §1340 (c)(1).   
 52. Id. § 1340(c)(3)(A)–(D). 
 53. 30 C.F.R. § 250.202(a)–(e).   
 54. See, e.g., id. §§ 250.211–250.228 (providing additional information on what 
exploration plans must include with respect to, inter alia, geological and geophysical 
information (§ 250.214); biological, physical, and socioeconomic information (§ 
250.216); solid and liquid waste information (§ 250.217); air emissions (§ 250.218); oil 
and hazardous substance spills information (§ 250.219); environmental monitoring 
information (§ 250.221); lease stipulations (§ 250.222); mitigation measures (§ 250.223); 
support aircraft and vessels (§ 250.224); onshore facilities (§ 250.225); Coastal Zone 
Management Act information (§ 250.226); and environmental impact analysis (§ 
250.227). 
2011] Shortcomings and Solutions 277 
 
submitted.”55  BOEM will not deem an exploration plan submitted until 
the plan’s proponent has corrected all problems or deficiencies in the 
plan.56   
After BOEM deems an exploration plan submitted, the agency must 
send the plan, along with supporting information, to representatives from 
affected states,57 review and evaluate the impacts of the exploration 
activities,58 and prepare environmental documentation pursuant to 
NEPA.59  BOEM may require a plan proponent to change its exploration 
plan during the review process.60  From the time BOEM deems an 
exploration plan submitted, the agency has just thirty days to approve, 
require modification of, or disapprove the exploration plan.61   
BOEM must approve an exploration plan if it finds that the plan is 
consistent with the provisions of OCSLA, the provisions of regulations 
implementing OCSLA, and the provisions of the underlying lease(s).62  
The agency may not approve an exploration plan if proposed activities 
“would probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish 
and other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not 
leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or 
human environment” and the activities cannot be modified to avoid that 
harm or damage.63  If BOEM disapproves a plan, it may cancel the 
underlying lease and the lessee is entitled to compensation.64 
Beyond approval of an exploration plan, OCS operators may have to 
obtain other approvals from BOEM before they begin exploratory 
drilling.65  Operators also may need to obtain permits from other federal 
agencies.  For example, operators may need a discharge permit under the 
Clean Water Act,66 or an emissions permit under the Clean Air Act,67 
                                            
 55. Id. § 250.231(a). 
 56. Id. § 250.231(b).    
 57. Id. § 250.232(a)(1)(2). 
 58. 30 C.F.R. § 250.232(b).   
 59. Id. § 250.232(c). 
 60. Id. § 250.232(d).   
 61. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.233.   
 62. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1).   
 63. Id. §§ 1334(a)(2)(A)(i), 1340(c)(1)(A) & (B). 
 64. Id. § 1340(c)(1)(B). 
 65. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.281 (listing required approvals for applications for 
permits to drill, for production safety systems, for new platforms and other structures (or 
major modifications to platforms and other structures), and for applications to install 
lease term pipelines).  
 66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (establishing a permit system for the discharge 
of pollutants into navigable waters).   
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from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); or they may need a 
permit for the “incidental take” of marine mammals under the MMPA68 
from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
5.  Development and production 
If exploratory drilling reveals economically recoverable oil, an OCS 
operator may initiate development and production activities.  In OCS 
areas outside the Western Gulf of Mexico, operators must submit a 
development and production plan before they begin development 
operations.69  In OCS areas within the Western Gulf of Mexico, operators 
must submit a “development operations coordination document” before 
they conduct development and production activities.70  Operators who 
plan to use non-conventional production or completion technology must 
submit a “deepwater operations plan” and “conceptual plan” before they 
conduct post-drilling installation activities.71  Finally, before beginning 
production from development projects located in more than 400 meters 
of water, operators must submit a “conservation information 
document.”72   
BOEM regulations specify the conditions under which operators 
must submit each type of plan, as well as the required contents of each 
plan.73  For example, a development and production plan, or development 
operations coordination document, must include information similar to 
that which is required for an exploration plan, but must provide 
                                                                                                  
 67. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006) (providing for requirements to control air pollution 
from certain OCS sources).   
 68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(i) (2006) (providing for the issuance of permits to 
allow the incidental take, by harassment, of small numbers of marine mammals). 
 69. 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a) (requiring an operator to submit a development and 
production plan before conducting any development and production activities on a lease 
or unit in any OCS area other than the Western Gulf of Mexico); see also 43 U.S.C. § 
1351(a)(1) (2006) (requiring lessees to submit development and production plans for 
leases located in OCS areas outside the Gulf of Mexico); id. § 1351(l) (allowing the 
Secretary of the Interior to require submission of development and production plans for 
OCS areas in the Gulf of Mexico that are adjacent to Florida).  
 70. 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a). 
 71. Id.; see also id. § 250.286(b) (noting that the Deepwater Operations Plan process 
consists of both a Deepwater Operations Plan and a Conceptual Plan).   
 72. Id. § 250.201(a).  
 73. See id. §§ 250.241–250.285 (providing regulatory process relating to development 
and production plans and development operations coordination documents); id. §§ 
250.286–250.295 (providing regulatory process relating to deepwater operations plans); 
id. §§ 250.296–250.299 (providing regulatory process relating to conservation 
information documents).  
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additional information to address the increased scale of operations.74  A 
deepwater operations plan must provide a variety of information, 
including: a description and schematic of a typical wellbore, casing, and 
completion; details on mooring, stationkeeping, drilling, completion, and 
riser systems; and pipeline information.75  A conceptual plan must 
provide information such as an overview of the development concept and 
the distance of each proposed well to the production platform.76  A 
conservation information document must discuss the development of a 
reservoir; contain well log data and reservoir parameters; include 
structure maps; and provide other information.77 
Assuming a development and production plan or development 
operations coordination document satisfies all regulatory requirements, 
BOEM must deem the plan or document submitted within twenty-five 
working days of submission to the agency.78   Once a plan or document is 
“deemed submitted,” BOEM must take certain actions, including sending 
the plan or document to certain public officials and agencies, making the 
plan or document available to the general public, and initiating an 
internal review process.79  BOEM must also evaluate the environmental 
impacts of the activities described in the plan or document by preparing 
documentation pursuant to NEPA.80 
BOEM must make a decision on a “deemed submitted” development 
and production plan, or development operations coordination document, 
within sixty calendar days after either the close of required comment 
periods, the day the final environmental impact statement—if any—is 
released or adopted, or the date of the last amendment of a development 
operations coordination document.81  BOEM may require modification if 
the plan or document fails to meet all requirements, and it may 
disapprove the plan if specific conditions apply.82  BOEM must approve 
a development and production plan or development operations 
coordination document if it complies with all applicable requirements.83  
As with exploration drilling activities, operators may also be required to 
                                            
 74. Id. §§ 250.241–250.262.   
 75. Id. § 250.292 (2010). 
 76. Id. § 250.289. 
 77. Id. § 250.297. 
 78. Id. § 250.266(a). 
 79. Id. § 250.267.   
 80. Id. § 250.269. 
 81. Id. § 250.270(a)(1) (2010).   
 82. Id. §§ 250.270(b), 250.271. 
 83. Id. § 250.270(b)(1).   
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secure additional permits from BOEM and/or other agencies before they 
commence development and production drilling activities.     
B.  Spill Planning, Response, and Liability Under OPA 90 and the Clean 
Water Act 
OPA 90—including its amendments to the Clean Water Act—is the 
primary statute governing issues of planning, prevention, response, and 
liability for oil spills in marine waters.84  Congress enacted OPA 90 in 
the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.85  The statute expanded the 
federal government’s ability to prepare for and respond to oil spills on or 
affecting U.S. waterways and coastlines by establishing new 
requirements and by amending extensively the federal Clean Water Act.  
Among other things, OPA 90 attempted to strengthen and clarify the 
federal government’s role in oil spill planning, preparedness, and 
response.  It also expanded existing liability provisions within the Clean 
Water Act.  
1.  Framework for Oil Spill Planning and Response  
OPA 90’s amendments to the Clean Water Act established a multi-
tier framework for planning for, and responding to, oil spills.  At the 
broadest tier, a National Contingency Plan “provide[s] for efficient, 
coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil and 
hazardous substance discharges, including containment, dispersal, and 
removal of oil and hazardous substances.”86  The National Contingency 
Plan is prepared by a multi-agency team led by EPA,87 and must establish 
procedures and standards for responding to worst-case oil spill 
scenarios.88 
                                            
 84. See, e.g.,  NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 83 (“[T]he Oil Pollution Act of 
1990, supplemented by a Presidential Executive Order, imposes a panoply of oil-spill 
planning, preparedness, and response requirements on fixed and floating facilities 
engaged in oil and gas exploration, development, and production on the outer continental 
shelf.” (citations omitted)).  
 85. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33705, OIL SPILLS IN 
U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 
(2009) (noting that Congress enacted OPA 90 in response to shortcomings in the 
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill).  
 86. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(1), (2) (2006). 
 87. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.2, 300.110, 300.175 (2010). 
 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(J) (2006). 
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Below the national level, regional response teams are responsible for 
planning and coordinating preparedness and response at the regional 
level.89  Regional response teams include representatives from federal 
agencies as well as state and local government representatives.90  These 
teams facilitate the “development and coordination of preparedness 
activities before a response action is taken,” and help coordinate 
“assistance and advice” during response actions.91 They also develop 
Regional Contingency Plans, which are designed “to coordinate timely, 
effective response by various federal agencies and other organizations.”92  
Regional response teams help to provide oversight and consistency for 
area- and facility-specific response plans within the region.93 
Area committees, comprised of federal, state, and local agencies, 
operate below the regional level.94  Area Committees are tasked with 
preparing Area Contingency Plans.95  These plans must, among other 
things, “be adequate to remove a worst case discharge, and to mitigate or 
prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge, from a vessel, offshore 
facility, or onshore facility operating in or near the area.”96  They must 
also describe areas of special economic or environmental importance, list 
equipment available to respond to a spill, compile a list of local spill 
response experts, and describe how the Area Contingency Plan is 
integrated with other spill response plans.97  
Finally, at the narrowest tier are facility-specific spill response 
plans.98  Unlike the response plans discussed above, facility response 
plans are prepared by the owners or operators of those facilities, such as 
oil and gas companies.99  In general, vessels and facilities cannot handle, 
store, or transport oil if they do not have a plan approved by (or 
submitted to) the appropriate agency.100  Facility response plans must 
                                            
 89. 40 C.F.R. § 300.115(a) (2010). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 300.115(a)(1). 
 92. Id. § 300.210(b). 
 93. Id. § 300.115(a)(2).   
 94. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(A), (B) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2010) 
(defining “Area Committee”). 
 95. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(B)(i). 
 96. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(C)(i); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(c) (2010). 
 97. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(c) (2010). 
 98. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.211 (2010). 
 99. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006); see also 30 C.F.R. § 254.1(a)  (2010) (“If 
you are the owner or operator of an oil handling, storage, or transportation facility, and it 
is located seaward of the coast line, you must submit a spill-response plan to MMS for 
approval.”). 
 100. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(F) (2006). 
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include “a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a 
worst case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such a discharge, of 
oil or a hazardous substance.”101  In addition, among other requirements, 
facility response plans must be consistent with the national and area 
contingency plans for the given region, must specify the private 
personnel and equipment that will be available to respond to a worst-case 
spill, and must “describe the training, equipment testing, periodic 
unannounced drills, and response actions” that will be carried pursuant to 
the plan.102  BOEM has promulgated regulations that govern facility 
response plans for offshore facilities, such as drilling rigs and 
platforms.103  
2.  Agency Jurisdiction 
Under the OPA 90 framework, the party or parties that cause an oil 
spill—called “responsible parties”104—are primarily responsible for 
cleaning up the spill.105  However, federal agencies also play key roles.  
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
and Executive Orders and memoranda of understanding establish the 
jurisdictions of the agencies.106  For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has 
primary oil spill response authority offshore; it is responsible for 
coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and private parties and 
overseeing spill cleanup efforts.107  NOAA’s Office of Response and 
                                            
 101. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). 
 102. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv).  
 103. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 254 (2010); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.211(b) (2010) (noting 
BOEM regulations apply to offshore facilities). 
 104. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) (2006) (defining “responsible party”). 
 105. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E, § 2.3(b) (“Cleanup responsibility for an oil 
discharge immediately falls on the responsible party.”). 
 106. See Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 18, 1991); see also 
Memorandum of Understanding Among the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of 
Transportation, and Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, App. B, 40 
C.F.R. Part 112, app. B. 
 107. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b)(1) (2010) (noting that the Coast Guard provides 
coordination of cleanup activities in coastal areas); 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E § 3.3.1 
(providing that the Coast Guard will provide On-Scene Coordinators “for oil discharges, 
including discharges from facilities and vessels under the jurisdiction of another federal 
agency, within or threatening the coastal zone”). The Environmental Protection Agency 
has primary response authority for inland spills.  Id.  
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Restoration provides scientific analysis and consultation during spill-
response activities.108  
Under existing law, the federal agencies responsible for responding 
to an oil spill are not necessarily the agencies responsible for overseeing 
planning and preparation for an oil spill.  For example, even though the 
Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing oil spill response efforts in 
offshore areas, BOEM regulates oil spill planning and preparedness for 
offshore oil and gas facilities and offshore production pipelines.109 
3.  Oil Spill Liability 
OPA 90 consolidated and broadened existing liability provisions to 
establish a new liability structure for oil spills.110  Under that structure, 
responsible parties are liable for removal costs and damages associated 
with the discharge or threat of discharge of oil into navigable waters, 
shorelines, or the Exclusive Economic Zone.111  A responsible party is 
liable for all cleanup costs incurred by both government agencies and 
private parties.112  Under OPA 90, responsible parties are also liable for a 
broad range of damages including injury to natural resources, loss of real 
or personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, lost 
revenues resulting from destruction of property or natural resource 
injury, lost profits resulting from property loss or natural resource injury, 
and costs of providing extra public services during or after spill 
response.113 
OPA 90’s liability scheme established caps for cleanup costs and 
other damages (except in limited situations such as gross negligence or 
willful misconduct).114  For example, liability for offshore facilities is 
capped at $75 million; liability for onshore facilities and deepwater ports 
                                            
 108. 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b)(7); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E, § 6.4.1.  “The 
Office provides comprehensive solutions to environmental hazards caused by oil, 
chemicals, and marine debris.”  Office of Response and Restoration, NOAA NAT’L 
OCEAN SERVICE, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/#2 (last visited March 28, 2011). 
 109. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 254 (2010) (regulating oil spill response planning requirements 
for offshore facilities).  
 110. See, e.g., RAMSEUR, supra note 85, at 11. 
 111. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
 112. Id. § 2702(b)(1). 
 113. Id. § 2702(b)(2). 
 114. Id. § 2704. 
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is limited to $350 million.115  Defenses to liability may include acts of 
God, acts of war, and acts or omissions of a third party.116 
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress imposed a five-cent-per-
barrel tax on the oil industry to support the already-existing Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund, but the five-cent rate ended on December 31, 
1994.117  In April 2006, the tax resumed as required by the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005.118  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
increased the tax rate to eight cents per barrel through 2016 and nine 
cents per barrel in 2017.119  Monies from the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund may be used to pay for a limited number of expenses including, but 
not limited to, costs associated with uncompensated removal and damage 
costs, response to and removal of oil spills, assessment of damage to 
natural resources and development and implementation of plans to 
restore or replace those resources, and loss of government revenue.120  
However, payout from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund cannot exceed 
$1 billion for “any single incident,” and natural resource damage 
assessments and claims relating to any single incident cannot exceed 
$500 million.121  
C.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
NEPA is the “basic national charter for protection of the 
environment.”122  It is designed to ensure that federal decision-makers 
“will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information 
concerning significant environmental impacts” and that “relevant 
information will be made available” to the public.123  While it is often 
described as a procedural statute, “NEPA plays a unique role in injecting 
consideration of environmental effects in what otherwise would be single 
                                            
 115. Id. § 2704(a)(3), (4). 
 116. Id. § 2703(a).  
 117. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7505(a), 
(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2363, (1989) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4611 to provide that the five-
cent-per-barrel tax was in effect after Jan. 1, 1990 and before Jan. 1, 1995). 
 118. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 109-58, § 1361, 119 Stat. 594, 1058–59 
(2005) (reinstating tax to fund the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund beginning April 1, 2006). 
 119. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 
405(a)(1), (b),  122 Stat. 3765, 3860–61 (2008) (increasing tax rates and providing that 
the tax will not apply after Dec. 31, 2017). 
 120. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2006). 
 121. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
 122. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2010). 
 123. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (quoting Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)). 
2011] Shortcomings and Solutions 285 
 
resource-driven decisions.”124  Federal agency actions—such as issuance 
of OCS oil and gas leasing programs, issuance of OCS leases, and 
decisions to approve site-specific OCS oil and gas activities—often 
trigger NEPA’s environmental analysis requirements.  
Broadly speaking, NEPA provides for three levels of environmental 
analysis.125  First, if a proposed agency action is a “major federal action    
[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” NEPA 
requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the 
environmental impacts of the proposed action.126  This detailed 
statement, called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),127 should 
“provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts 
and . . . inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable 
alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance 
the quality of the human environment.”128  When evaluating “reasonably 
foreseeable” environmental impacts, an EIS must consider “impacts 
which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of 
occurrence is low.”129  While agencies generally prepare EISs for specific 
actions, such as a particular oil and gas lease sale, they may also prepare 
“programmatic” EISs to evaluate the potential impacts of broader agency 
actions, including the development of new regulations or programs.130  
To avoid duplication and to facilitate greater focus “on the issues specific 
to the subsequent action,” NEPA regulations encourage federal agencies 
to “tier” EISs such that EISs for later, narrower actions incorporate prior, 
broader-scale EISs by reference.131  While an EIS does not require the 
agency to adopt any particular alternative, it should inform the agency 
decisionmaking process.132  The EIS process leads to a “Record of 
                                            
 124. Janis Searles, National Environmental Policy Act, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 181, 181-82 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton, eds., 
2008) (discussing programmatic EISs). 
 125. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, PRACTICES, 
AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (2010). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2006).   
 127. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2010). 
 128. Id. § 1502.1. 
 129. Id. § 1502.22(b)(1). 
 130. See id. § 1500.4(i) (allowing the use of “program, policy, or plan environmental 
impact statements”); see also Searles, supra note 124, at 187-88 (discussing 
programmatic EISs). 
 131. Id. § 1502.20; see also id. § 1500.4(i) (discussing tiering from programmatic 
EISs). 
 132. Id. § 1502.14.   
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Decision” in which the agency must state its final decision, identify the 
alternatives it  considered, discuss how it balanced various factors, state 
whether the final decision avoided or minimized environmental harm, 
and—where applicable—adopt a monitoring and enforcement program 
to facilitate mitigation.133 
Second, if an agency action is of a type that does not normally 
require an EIS, an agency may choose to prepare a less rigorous analysis, 
called an Environmental Assessment (EA), to determine whether it is 
necessary to prepare an EIS.134  Agencies may also prepare EAs to “assist 
agency planning and decisionmaking.”135  An EA is “a concise public 
document” that must contain brief discussions of the need for, 
alternatives to, and environmental impacts of, the proposed agency 
action.136  If an EA reveals that a proposed action will have significant 
impacts on the environment, the agency must prepare an EIS.137  If not, 
the agency may produce a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) 
that explains briefly why the proposed action will not have significant 
environmental impacts.138 
Third, NEPA regulations allow federal agencies to identify specific 
categories of actions—called “categorical exclusions”—that “do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment.”139   If an action is categorically excluded, an agency need 
not prepare an EIS or EA for that action.140  When federal agencies 
identify categorical exclusions, they must “provide for extraordinary 
circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a 
significant environmental effect.”141   
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed that 
the scope of BOEM’s NEPA analyses for OCS oil and gas actions may 
differ, depending on the stage of the OCSLA process that the agency is 
analyzing.142  The court noted that BOEM “may issue a broader EIS at 
                                            
 133. Id. § 1505.2. 
 134. Id. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9. 
 135. Id. § 1501.3(b). 
 136. Id. § 1508.9. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18 (2010) (defining 
“major federal action”); 1508.27 (defining “significantly”); 1508.3; 1508.8 (defining 
“affecting” and “effects”); 1508.14 (defining “human environment”). 
 138. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2010). 
 139. Id. § 1508.4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
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the earlier ‘need and site selection’ stage of a program, and issue 
subsequent, more detailed environmental impact statements at the 
program’s later, more site-specific stage.”143  In practice, BOEM has 
prepared broad, programmatic EISs when it issues a five-year oil and gas 
leasing program or a lease sale that covers millions of acres of the 
OCS.144  The agency has analyzed decisions about site-specific oil and 
gas activities, such as approval of exploration plans, in EAs.145  In many 
cases, BOEM has not prepared EISs or EAs for site-specific OCS 
activities because it created and applied categorical exclusions for these 
activities.146 
D.  Other Environmental Statutes 
A number of other statutes in addition to OCSLA, OPA 90, and 
NEPA may be implicated at various stages of the OCS oil and gas 
process.  For example, proposed OCS actions may trigger the need to 
prepare a consistency determination pursuant to the CZMA.147  If an 
agency’s OCS action may affect a species listed under the ESA, it will 
likely require consultation with NOAA or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service as to the impacts of the action.148  Similarly, proposed OCS 
actions may require consultation with NOAA pursuant to the MSA.149  
                                            
 143. Id. at 474 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28). 
 144. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS 
LEASING PROGRAM: 2007–2012 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007–2012 FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM FEIS] (analyzing nationwide leasing 
program);  MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE 
SALE 193 AND SEISMIC SURVEYING ACTIVITIES IN THE CHUKCHI SEA, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT I-2 (2007) [hereinafter LEASE SALE 193 FEIS] 
(analyzing a lease sale covering about 34 million acres). 
 145. See generally, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 
SHELL OFFSHORE INC. 2010 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN FOR 
CAMDEN BAY, ALASKA, BEAUFORT SEA LEASES (2009) [hereinafter 2009 BEAUFORT EA]; 
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL GULF OF MEXICO, INC. 
2010 EXPLORATION DRILLING PROGRAM, BURGER, CRACKERJACK, AND SW SHOEBILL 
PROSPECTS CHUKCHI SEA OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2009) [hereinafter 2009 CHUKCHI 
EA]. 
 146. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 25 (describing BOEM’s 
application of categorical exclusions in the Gulf of Mexico).   
 147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2006) (providing for determinations to facilitate 
consistency with State coastal management programs). 
 148. See id. § 1536(a)(2) (providing for interagency consultation with respect to 
species listed under the ESA). 
 149. See id. § 1855(b)(2) (providing for interagency consultation with respect to 
essential fish habitat). 
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As noted above, drill rigs and associated emissions sources may trigger 
the need for an emissions permit from EPA pursuant to the Clean Air 
Act.150  Similarly, a drill rig’s discharges into marine waters may require 
a Clean Water Act permit from EPA.151   OCS activities that could result 
in the harassment of marine mammals may require an incidental 
harassment authorization from NOAA.152  Other statutes may come into 
play, as well.  The statutes listed in this paragraph are not the focus of 
this Article.  Nonetheless, they may affect proposed OCS activities in 
important ways.  
III.  INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER: 
INVESTIGATIONS AND REFORMS 
Shortly after the April 20, 2010 blowout and explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon, it was obvious that the scale of the disaster was 
unprecedented, that it would have significant impacts to the Gulf of 
Mexico’s people, economies, and wildlife, and that those impacts would 
be both immediate and long-lasting.  Decision-makers in the executive 
branch and in Congress acknowledged that governance of OCS oil and 
gas activities needed to change.  In the days and months that followed the 
blowout, President Obama, Secretary of the Interior Salazar, and others 
launched investigations—some broad, others narrow—to examine 
various aspects of the disaster.  At DOI, Secretary of the Interior Salazar 
launched a program to restructure the Department’s oversight of the 
industry and initiated other targeted reforms.  Legislators in the 111th 
Congress crafted, but did not pass, legislation designed to address 
problems in the existing law.  The following Section reviews some of 
these efforts. 
A.  Investigations and Studies Related to the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster 
As noted at the outset of this Article, on May 21, 2010, President 
Obama created the “National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.”153  He directed the National 
                                            
 150. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006) (providing for requirements to control air pollution 
from certain OCS sources).   
 151. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (establishing a permit system for the discharge 
of pollutants into navigable waters).   
 152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D) (2006) (providing for the issuance of permits to 
allow the incidental take, by harassment, of small numbers of marine mammals). 
 153. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397, 29,397 (May 26, 2010). 
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Commission “to examine the relevant facts and circumstances 
concerning the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster; [and] 
develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil 
spills associated with offshore drilling, taking into consideration the 
environmental, public health, and economic effects of such options . . . 
.”154  The National Commission issued its report and recommendations 
on January 11, 2011.155  Although the National Commission’s 
recommendations may eventually spur administrative or legislative 
change, the recommendations themselves have no immediate effect on 
existing law, regulation, or policy.   
At DOI, Secretary Salazar initiated an internal study of the 
Department’s practices related to OCS oil and gas activities.  On April 
30, 2010, he created an OCS Safety Oversight Board.156  Among other 
things, Secretary Salazar tasked the Oversight Board with “making 
recommendations to improve and strengthen the Department’s overall 
management, regulation, and oversight of OCS operations.”157  On 
September 1, 2010, the Oversight Board issued a report that included a 
suite of recommendations for reform.158  Three days later, the Director of 
BOEM released an “implementation plan” that described how BOEM 
would address—or was already addressing—the Oversight Board’s 
recommendations.159   
Interior Secretary Salazar initiated additional studies relating to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster as well.  He asked DOI’s Office of Inspector 
General to evaluate BOEM’s practices.160  The Office of Inspector 
General cooperated with the Oversight Board and, building on the 
                                            
 154. Id. 
 155. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2. 
 156. SEC’Y OF INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,298: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD (Apr. 30, 2010). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY 
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR (Sept. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=40069. 
 159. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN RESPONSE TO THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY 
OVERSIGHT BOARD’S SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
(Sept. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule= 
security/getfile&PageID=43676.  See also infra Part III.B. 
 160. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CR-EV-MMS-0015-
2010, A NEW HORIZON: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/A%20New%20Horizon%20Public.pdf.  
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recommendations of the Oversight Board, issued its own final report in 
December 2010.161  In addition to the Oversight Board and Office of 
Inspector General investigations, Secretary Salazar commissioned a more 
targeted study by the National Academy of Engineering—focused on 
technical issues—to analyze the causes of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster to help identify “corrective steps” necessary “to address the 
mechanical failures underlying the accident.”162  The National Academy 
released an interim letter to Secretary Salazar on November 16, 2010.163 
DOI also participated in at least two joint studies.  First, on April 21, 
2010 the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and BOEM began a joint 
investigation of the causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.164  The 
investigators “have the power to issue subpoenas, hold public hearings, 
call witnesses, and take other steps” to help them determine the cause of 
the disaster.165  As of this writing, the joint investigation is ongoing.166  
Second, on May 14, 2010, Secretary Salazar and Council on 
Environmental Quality Chair Nancy Sutley announced a joint review that 
focused on BOEM’s implementation of NEPA.167  Working with BOEM, 
the Council on Environmental Quality issued a final report and 
recommendations on August 16, 2010.168   
In addition to the foregoing studies, the Coast Guard prepared an 
“Incident Specific Preparedness Review” designed “to examine the 
                                            
 161. Id.  
 162. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Launches Safety and Envtl. Prot. 
Reforms to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations para. 8 (May 11, 
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-
Environmental-Protection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-
Operations.cfm?renderforprint=1&. 
 163. Letter from Donald C. Winter, Nat’l Acad. of Eng’g and Nat’l Research Council 
of the Nat’l Acads., to Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/DH_Interim_Report_final.pdf.  
 164. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sec’y Napolitano and Sec’y Salazar 
Launch Full Investigation of Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mex. (April 27, 
2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1272395702575.shtm; see 
also Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar and Napolitano Launch Full 
Investigation of Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mex. (April 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/SECRETARY-NAPOLITANO-
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HORIZON-INCIDENT-IN-THE-GULF-OF-MEXICO.cfm?renderforprint=1&. 
 165. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 164, para. 5. 
 166. See DEEPWATER HORIZON JOINT INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/site/3043/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (official 
site). 
 167. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 1.  
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implementation and effectiveness of the preparedness and response to the 
BP Deepwater Horizon incident as it related to the National Contingency 
Plan, Area Contingency Plans, and other oil spill response plans.”169   
The Coast Guard distributed its final report in March of 2011.170  Finally, 
the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (Chemical 
Safety Board) launched an examination of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster that “include[s] an examination of key technical factors, the 
safety cultures involved, and the effectiveness of relevant laws, 
regulations, and industry standards.”171  As of this writing, the Chemical 
Safety Board’s investigation is ongoing.  
In addition to triggering a considerable number of studies and 
investigations, the Deepwater Horizon disaster also gave rise to change, 
both actual and attempted.  The following sections focus on reforms 
implemented by DOI and reforms considered—but not enacted—by 
Congress.   
B.  Reforms at the Department of the Interior 
Secretary Salazar began to implement reforms at DOI soon after the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout and explosion.  Perhaps the most visible of 
these changes was the dissolution of MMS and the creation of three 
separate administrative agencies within DOI to take its place.  Secretary 
Salazar also instituted a temporary moratorium on deepwater drilling, 
tightened safety requirements for OCS operators, and restricted the use 
of categorical exclusions for deepwater exploration drilling. 
                                            
 169. U.S. COAST GUARD, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL INCIDENT SPECIFIC 
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 171. See Letter from John S. Bresland, Chairman, U.S. Chem. Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Bd., to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce and Bart Stupak, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 
and Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations (June 18, 2010), available at 
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Transocean_June_18_2010.pdf. 
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1.  Restructuring DOI’s Oversight of OCS Oil and Gas Activities 
Less than one month after the blowout and explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon, Secretary Salazar announced his intent to abolish 
the MMS and distribute its responsibilities among three separate 
agencies within DOI.172  Secretary Salazar undertook the restructuring 
project to resolve what he described as “conflicting missions” within 
MMS.173  By creating three distinct agencies, the Secretary hoped to 
“improve the management, oversight, and accountability of activities on 
the Outer Continental Shelf; ensure a fair return to the taxpayer from 
royalty and revenue collection and disbursement activities; and provide 
independent safety and environmental oversight and enforcement of 
offshore activities.”174   
Implementation of the restructuring program took place in phases.  
First, on June 18, 2010 Secretary Salazar changed the name of MMS to 
BOEMRE.175  BOEMRE was a transitional agency tasked with 
“exercis[ing] all authorities previously vested in the MMS.”176  Second, 
on October 1, 2010 Secretary Salazar established the Office of Natural 
Resources Revenue (ONRR).177  Among other things, ONRR assumed 
responsibility for the management of revenue from offshore leases.178  
Third, on January 19, 2011, Secretary Salazar announced that 
BOEMRE’s remaining responsibilities would be divided between two 
new Bureaus within DOI: BOEM would begin to carry out the 
Department’s OCS resource development and energy management 
functions, while BSEE would begin to oversee the Department’s OCS 
safety and enforcement functions.179  More specifically, BOEM will 
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carry out planning, leasing, environmental studies, NEPA analysis, 
resource evaluation, and other related functions, while BSEE will 
“enforce safety and environmental regulations.”180  DOI expects to 
complete the implementation of its reorganization program by October 1, 
2011. 
2.  Temporary Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling 
In addition to instituting internal reorganizations within DOI, 
Secretary Salazar temporarily halted certain on-water drilling activities in 
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  On May 27, 2010, 
Secretary Salazar ordered a six-month moratorium that prohibited new 
OCS operators from drilling new deepwater wells and required 
deepwater wells that were in the process of being drilled to halt 
operations “at the first safe stopping point.”181   
Some oil and gas service providers affected by the prohibition 
challenged the moratorium in federal district court and requested that the 
court issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the moratorium.182  The 
district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary 
injunction on June 22, 2010.183  On July 12, 2010, in response to the 
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La. 2010). 
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district court’s injunction, Secretary Salazar rescinded the original May 
27 moratorium and issued a new, superseding moratorium scheduled to 
“last until November 30, 2010 or until such earlier time that the 
Secretary determines that deepwater drilling operations can proceed 
safely.”184   
In the months following July 12, 2010 BOEM implemented new 
rules—described below in Section IV (B)(4)—designed to enhance the 
safety of OCS drilling operations.  On October 12, 2010, Secretary 
Salazar announced that “the strengthened safety measures” that BOEM 
had implemented, “along with improved spill response and blowout 
containment capabilities, have reduced risks to a point where operators 
who play by the rules and clear the higher bar can be allowed to resume” 
deepwater drilling operations.185  Pursuant to the Secretary’s decision, the 
CEOs of companies seeking to drill deepwater wells must certify that 
their company is in compliance with all applicable rules, and operators 
must demonstrate that they have oil spill containment devices readily 
available for deployment.186 
On February 28, 2011, BOEM announced that it “approved the first 
deepwater drilling permit since the Deepwater Horizon explosion and 
resulting oil spill,” noting that it approved the permit because “the 
operator successfully demonstrated that it [could] drill its deepwater well 
safely and that it [was] capable of containing a subsea blowout if it were 
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to occur.”187  Since that time, the agency has continued to approve 
deepwater drilling applications.188 
3.  Limits on the Use of Categorical Exclusions 
DOI also took steps to limit the use of categorical exclusions under 
NEPA when approving OCS oil and gas activities.  On August 16, 
2010—the same day that the Council on Environmental Quality released 
its report on BOEM’s implementation of NEPA—Secretary Salazar 
announced that DOI would “undertake[ ] a comprehensive review of its 
[NEPA] process and the use of categorical exclusions for exploration and 
drilling on the [OCS].” 189  In the interim, Secretary Salazar directed 
BOEM to “restrict its use of categorical exclusions for offshore oil and 
gas development to activities involving limited environmental risk . . . 
.”190   
Specifically, the Director of BOEM prohibited the agency from 
using certain categorical exclusions to satisfy NEPA review requirements 
for plans that require an application for a permit to drill and that involve 
the use of a subsea blowout preventer or a surface blowout preventer on 
a floating facility.191  Pursuant to the memorandum, BOEM will use an 
EA to analyze these types of projects.192  The Director of BOEM directed 
the agency to prepare categorical exclusion reviews (CER) for other 
types of OCS plans.193  CERs assess whether the plan implicates any 
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“extraordinary circumstances” that would require preparation of an 
EA.194 
As of this writing, DOI’s NEPA review is ongoing. When DOI 
completes its review process, it intends to “announce a new approach to 
NEPA compliance that takes into account the joint recommendations 
included in CEQ’s [August 16, 2010] report, statutory and/or regulatory 
constraints, and other appropriate factors.”195 
4.  Strengthened Safety Requirements for OCS Lessees 
DOI also took steps to strengthen safety requirements that governed 
OCS oil and gas operations.  In June 2010, DOI issued a Notice to 
Lessees (NTL)196 that required oil and gas lessees and operators who 
apply for new drilling permits or seek approval of exploration or 
development plans or development operations coordination documents 
“to submit information that addresses the possibility of a blowout and 
detail[ ] steps they are taking to prevent blowouts.”197  Among other 
things, the NTL requires OCS operators to provide a well-specific 
blowout and worst-case discharge scenario, as well as the assumptions 
and calculations behind these scenarios.198 
In September 2010, DOI announced two new safety rules: the 
drilling safety rule and the workplace safety rule.199  The drilling safety 
rule requires operators who apply for permits for drilling projects to meet 
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new standards for, and obtain independent third-party certification of, 
well casing and cementing; document blowout preventer inspections and 
maintenance; obtain independent verification of subsea well control 
equipment; and more.200  The workplace safety rule will “require 
operators to develop and implement Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems (SEMS).”201   SEMS are “comprehensive safety 
and environmental impact program[s] designed to reduce human and 
organizational errors as the root cause of work-related accidents and 
offshore oil spills.”202   
Later in the year, DOI issued another NTL: No. 2010-N10 (NTL 
10).203  NTL 10 applies to operators using subsea blowout preventers or 
surface blowout preventers on floating facilities.204  It requires operators 
to submit, with each application for a well permit, a statement by an 
authorized company official that asserts that the operator will conduct its 
activities in compliance with all applicable regulations, including the 
new drilling safety rule.205  NTL 10 also confirms that BOEM will 
evaluate whether the operator has submitted information adequate to 
demonstrate “that it has access to and can deploy containment resources” 
adequate to respond promptly to “a blowout or other loss of well 
control.”206   
In January 2011, DOI announced the creation of an Offshore Energy 
Safety Advisory Committee, designed “to provide advice on matters and 
actions relating to offshore energy safety, including, but not limited to 
drilling and workplace safety, well intervention and containment, and oil 
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spill response.”207  “The Committee will also facilitate collaborative 
research and development, training and execution in these and other 
areas relating to offshore energy safety.”208 
C.  Congressional Response to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
Congress also took action in response to the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.  Both the House of Representatives and the Senate prepared 
legislative language designed to address flaws in the laws governing 
OCS oil and gas activities and oil spill liability and response.  The 
primary legislative vehicle for OCS-related reform in the House of 
Representatives was H.R. 3534,  the Consolidated Land, Energy, and 
Aquatic Resources Act of 2010 (CLEAR Act).209  Title I of the CLEAR 
Act would have abolished the MMS and replaced it with a series of three 
new agencies within DOI.210  Provisions in Title II would have made 
important amendments to OCSLA.211  For example, it would have made 
changes to OSCLA’s policy statement;212 established new OCS leasing 
standards;213 provided for mandatory funding to support protection, 
maintenance, and restoration of ocean and coastal ecosystems;214 
strengthened requirements for exploration plans and eliminated the 
thirty-day deadline for approval of such plans;215 required additional 
consideration of environmental factors and consultation with the 
Secretary of Commerce when preparing five-year OCS oil and gas 
leasing programs;216 and more.  Title V of the CLEAR Act would have 
established restoration and scientific research and monitoring programs 
for the Gulf of Mexico;217 Title VI would have enacted provisions 
designed to facilitate coordinated, multi-sector planning for OCS 
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activities;218 and Title VII would have made significant changes to the 
existing laws governing oil spill liability and response.219  The House of 
Representatives passed the CLEAR Act on July 30, 2010.220 
In the Senate, the primary legislative response to the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster was S. 3663, the Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Spill 
Accountability Act of 2010.221  Like the CLEAR Act, the Senate bill 
contained provisions that would have restructured DOI’s administration 
of OCS activities,222 amended OCSLA,223 changed laws governing oil 
spill liability and response,224 and established a long-term research and 
monitoring program for the Gulf of Mexico,225 among other things.  
Unlike the CLEAR Act, however, the Senate bill was not passed.  As a 
result, as of this writing, Congress has not enacted any significant 
legislation to reform the governance of OCS oil and gas activities.  
IV.  THE WORK AHEAD: REMAINING SHORTCOMINGS IN THE OCS 
FRAMEWORK AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster generated intense scrutiny of the 
planning and oversight of OCS oil and gas leasing and drilling.  The 
scrutiny revealed that the administration of OCS oil and gas activities 
suffers from a range of serious shortcomings.  For example: the OCS 
policy set forth in OCSLA fails to prioritize protection of the marine 
environment; OCSLA and its implementing regulations lack substantive, 
enforceable standards sufficient to ensure safety and protect marine 
ecosystems; environmental analysis of OCS activities is deficient; oil 
spill planning and preparedness is inadequate; and OCS oil and gas 
activities are not well integrated with other ocean uses.  This Section 
describes these shortcomings in more detail, and recommends changes 
that would improve the policies and practices that govern OCS oil and 
gas activities.  
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A.  Prioritizing the Protection of Marine Ecosystems in OCS Policy 
The policy set forth in OCSLA states in part that the OCS should be 
made available for “expeditious and orderly development, subject to 
environmental safeguards.”226  This policy falls short because it fails to 
make protection of coastal and marine ecosystems the paramount policy 
objective.   
Under the existing OCS policy, BOEM has focused on the extraction 
of oil and gas and has treated protection of the coastal and marine 
environment as a secondary consideration.  For example, the National 
Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster noted that 
staff at BOEM “have reported that [agency] leasing coordinators and 
managers discouraged them from reaching conclusions about potential 
environmental impacts that would increase the burden on lessees, ‘thus 
causing unnecessary delays for operators.’”227  The National Commission 
noted that several BOEM scientists reported that “their managers 
believed the result of NEPA evaluations should always be a ‘green light’ 
to proceed” with oil and gas activities.228  The National Commission also 
discovered that some managers within BOEM “reportedly ‘changed or 
minimized the [BOEM] scientists’ potential environmental impact 
findings in [NEPA] documents to expedite’” the approval of plans for oil 
and gas activity.229  Similarly, a March 2010 Government Accountability 
Office study observed that BOEM “has . . . been vulnerable to 
allegations by stakeholders and former [BOEM] scientists of suppression 
or alteration of their work on environmental issues.”230  Further, a DOI 
Inspector General Report found that in one case, a manager at BOEM 
told a scientist who raised environmental concerns “to change his 
findings and, if he did not, ‘someone else would do it [for him].’”231   
Changing the overall OCS policy to one that prioritizes the 
protection of ocean ecosystems will not, on its own, prevent these kinds 
of abuses.  However, changing the policy may contribute to a cultural 
shift at BOEM and may help foster a work environment in which BOEM 
managers no longer feel pressured to expedite OCS oil and gas projects 
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at the expense of the environment.232  Changing the policy would also 
help ensure that governance of offshore oil and gas activities is 
consistent with the National Ocean Policy’s call to “protect, maintain, 
and restore the health and biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and 
Great Lakes ecosystems and resources.”233   
Congress should amend OCSLA’s policy statement to state that 
protection, maintenance, and restoration of coastal and ocean ecosystems 
is the paramount OCS policy objective, and extraction of mineral 
resources should be permitted only when it will not compromise that 
objective.  If Congress fails to amend OCSLA’s policy statement, BOEM 
should use its authority under existing law to implement the policy in a 
manner that offers the greatest protection to ocean and coastal 
ecosystems.234  Either way, BOEM should use its discretion to ensure 
that it authorizes OCS oil and gas lease sales, exploratory drilling, and 
development and production only when science shows that such actions 
can proceed with minimal risk to the health of ocean and coastal 
ecosystems. 
B.  Creating Substantive, Enforceable Standards to Govern OCS 
Operations 
In general, the statutory and regulatory provisions governing OCS oil 
and gas activities do not contain strong environmental standards.  
Although OCSLA requires BOEM to “balance” the potential benefits of 
oil and gas activities with risks to human, marine, and coastal 
environments,235 and to “consider” impacts to marine ecosystems,236 
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 235. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to 
“select the timing and location of leasing . . . so as to obtain a proper balance between the 
potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the 
potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone” (emphasis added)). 
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these requirements are not substantive, enforceable standards.  
Consequently, they do not ensure a minimum level of protection for the 
marine environment, species, or habitats.  Absent rigorous environmental 
standards, BOEM has the discretion to assign great weight to the benefits 
of oil and gas development and relatively little weight to the 
environmental risks of such development.  Similarly, absent substantive, 
enforceable standards, there is no guarantee that BOEM’s 
“consideration” of environmental impacts will lead to meaningful in-the-
water protections.  
Meaningful standards are necessary to ensure that OCS decision-
makers not only “balance” and “consider” the health of marine 
ecosystems, but also take concrete steps to protect those ecosystems from 
potential threats.  For example, a new standard should be implemented to 
ensure that federal regulators have adequate baseline scientific 
information before they make decisions about leasing, exploration, or 
development.  Another standard should be added to require federal 
regulators to identify and provide for the protection of important 
ecological areas before OCS areas are opened to oil and gas leasing.  Still 
another should require operators to demonstrate the ability to respond 
effectively to an oil spill in real-world conditions before those operators 
conduct site-specific oil and gas activities, and to use the highest possible 
safety and technology practices.  Congress could add such substantive 
standards to OCSLA through an amendment, or BOEM could use its 
discretion to implement environmental protection standards through the 
promulgation of new regulations or policies.   
1.  Creating a Standard for Baseline Science  
Baseline scientific information can be used to inform decisions about 
whether, when, and where to allow OCS oil and gas activities.  In 
addition, baseline science is necessary in the natural resource damage 
assessment process following an oil spill because the impacts of the spill 
must be measured against the environmental baseline that existed prior to 
                                                                                                  
 236. See, e.g., id. § 1344(a)(1) (“Management of the outer Continental Shelf shall be 
conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental values . . . 
and the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values . . . and the 
marine, coastal, and human environments.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1344(a)(2) 
(requiring the Secretary of the Interior to determine the timing and location of oil and gas 
activities “based on a consideration of” a variety of factors including, but not limited to 
“the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas” of the 
OCS (emphasis added)). 
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the spill.237  To ensure that decision-makers have adequate baseline 
science about OCS areas that may be subject to oil and gas activities, 
Congress or BOEM should implement standards that require the 
availability of specific types and quantities of baseline scientific 
information.  This information might include information on physical 
characteristics—such as data on the benthic environment, ocean currents, 
wind and weather patterns, and water temperature and salinity—as well 
as information about the ecosystem, such as the presence, distribution, 
and abundance of species and the web of relationships among those 
species.  Pursuant to these proposed baseline science standards, BOEM 
would not be authorized to make an area of the OCS available for leasing 
until the required type and quantity of baseline data is available for that 
area.238   
2.  Ensuring Protection of Important Ecological Areas 
Important ecological areas include, but are not limited to, important 
ocean habitats, areas of high productivity, migratory pathways, and areas 
important for subsistence purposes.239  Under the current OCS 
framework, BOEM is under no obligation to take steps to identify and 
protect important ecological areas from the effects of industrial 
development, such as oil and gas activity.  Instead, in the vast regions of 
the OCS open to leasing, the oil and gas industry has enormous control 
over the location of development. Oil and gas companies have no 
obligation to heed underlying ecological values, and they can choose 
lease sites from the millions or tens of millions of acres that BOEM 
                                            
 237. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 990.52 (2010) (noting that natural resource trustees “must 
quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of such injuries relative to baseline”); 
see also id. § 990.30 (defining “baseline” as “the condition of the natural resources and 
services that would have existed had the [oil spill] incident not occurred”). 
 238. The need for baseline science information is particularly acute in the Arctic OCS.  
See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 303 (“[S]cientific research on the 
ecosystems of the Arctic is difficult and expensive.  Good information exists for only a 
few species, and even for those, just for certain times of the year or in certain areas.”).  
“As a result, the Commission recommend[ed] an immediate, comprehensive federal 
research effort to provide a foundation of scientific information on the Arctic (with 
periodic review by the National Academy of Sciences), and annual stock assessments for 
marine mammals, fish, and birds that use the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.”  Id.  
 239. See MELANIE A. SMITH, ARCTIC MARINE SYNTHESIS: ATLAS OF THE CHUKCHI AND 
BEAUFORT SEAS 1-8 (2010) (defining important ecological areas as “areas in the ocean 
that disproportionately contribute to the health and biodiversity of the ocean ecosystem 
and therefore mandate special considerations and appropriate protections during coastal 
and marine spatial planning as well as in other management decisions”). 
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makes available.240  To promote healthy and resilient ocean ecosystems, 
important ecological areas must be identified and protected before 
BOEM allows industrial activities to proceed.241  To achieve this 
objective, Congress should amend OCSLA—or BOEM should amend its 
regulations or policies—to add a standard that requires federal regulators 
to gather information for the different regions of the OCS and identify 
important ecological areas within those regions.  The proposed standard 
should ensure that regulatory agencies preserve the vitality of important 
ecological areas by requiring operators to meet specific and stringent 
precautions before they conduct on-water activities.   
3.  Raising the Bar on Oil Spill Response 
As noted above, OCS operators must prepare oil spill response plans 
for their OCS facilities.  These documents must contain “a plan for 
responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case 
discharge,”242 and must “identify, and ensure . . . the availability of, 
private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum 
extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting 
from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of 
such a discharge.” 243  However, neither the statutory language nor the 
implementing regulations require OCS operators to demonstrate that 
their spill response plan will work.244   
For example, estimates following the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
reveal that despite the massive effort that BP activated to clean up the oil 
spill,245 response efforts were able to remove or chemically disperse only 
about one-third of the oil that was discharged from the Macondo well.246  
The National Commission determined that “[t]he technology available 
                                            
 240. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 241. The National Commission recommended that, “[i]n less well-explored areas, 
[BOEM] should reduce the size of lease sales so their geographic scope allows for a 
meaningful analysis of potential environmental impacts and identification of areas of 
ecological significance.”  NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262 (emphasis added). 
 242. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006). 
 243. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii).   
 244. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 132-133 (describing glaring errors in 
plan). 
 245. Id. at 133 (showing that, at its peak, more than 45,000 people were involved in the 
response effort).   
 246. See LUBCHENCO ET AL., supra note 4, Figure I (estimating that of the 4.9 million 
barrels of oil that was discharged, responders recovered 17 percent directly from the 
wellhead, skimmed 3 percent, burned 5 percent, and chemically dispersed 8 percent, for a 
total of 33 percent). 
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for cleaning up oil spills has improved only incrementally since 1990,” 
that “[f]ederal research and development programs in this area are 
underfunded,” and that the major oil companies have committed minimal 
resources to in-house research and development related to spill response 
technology.”247  
To spur better on-water cleanup results—and more investment in 
research and development for response technologies—Congress or 
BOEM should implement stringent oil spill response standards.  
Regulators should require operators to demonstrate the ability to meet 
specific performance standards in real-world conditions in the lease area 
before allowing operators to conduct drilling operations.  The 
performance standards should require operators to demonstrate, in 
simulated field trials, that they have in place adequate equipment, trained 
personnel, and resources to respond effectively in the event of a 
catastrophic spill.  Operators should be required to show that they can 
deploy their resources in real-world conditions, and that the chosen 
equipment is effective in meeting an established oil removal performance 
target.  These spill response standards should be enforced through 
independent third-party review of facility response plans and regular 
audits during the period of exploration and production. 
4.  Promoting Safety and Technology on the OCS 
OCS oil and gas operations should also be subject to tougher safety 
and technology standards.  A DOI Inspector General Report concluded 
that BOEM’s “process for developing or updating standards and 
regulations has not kept pace with new and emerging offshore 
technologies.”248  Congress or BOEM should require operators of all new 
offshore leases to demonstrate that they are using the most effective 
safety technology for exploration or development activity as a 
precondition to drilling.249  Standards regarding spill prevention 
technologies should be implemented, as well.  These might require 
redundant engineering controls such as multiple blowout prevention 
                                            
 247. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 269. 
 248. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 44.  
 249. At present, OCSLA calls for “the use of the best available and safest 
technologies[,]” and this mandate applies “on all new drilling and production operations 
and, wherever practicable, on existing operations.”  43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2006).  
However, this provision is weakened significantly by certain caveats: it applies only to 
certain types of equipment, and the Secretary of the Interior may waive the requirement if 
he determines that the additional cost of using the “best” or “safest” technology 
outweighs the additional benefits of using the technology.  Id. 
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systems, on-site blowout containment structures, and double-walled 
pipes or tanks.  All OCS leases should be required to incorporate the 
most environmentally protective timing and location stipulations, along 
with other terms designed to reduce the potential for environmental 
damage and adverse impacts on the coastal zone. 
C.  Improving Environmental Analysis of OCS Oil and Gas Activities 
BOEM’s current approach to OCS planning and evaluation of 
proposed oil and gas activities fails to ensure rigorous analysis of 
potential impacts and risks.  Congress or BOEM—working with other 
administrative agencies—should institute multiple changes to improve 
the process.  For example, federal agencies other than BOEM should 
have a greater role in planning and conducting environmental analyses 
for OCS oil and gas activities.  To make environmental review more 
meaningful, five-year OCS oil and gas leasing programs and individual 
OCS lease sales should focus on smaller, more targeted areas of the 
OCS; multi-million acre “area-wide” lease sales should be eliminated.  
NEPA analysis of offshore oil and gas activities must be improved to 
ensure that federal decision-makers conduct thorough analysis at all 
phases of the OCSLA process.  To facilitate environmental analysis at 
the exploration plan stage, Congress should eliminate the provision of 
OCSLA that requires approval of an exploration plan within thirty days 
of submission.250 
1.  Engaging Expert Agencies Beyond BOEM  
Under the current framework, expert federal agencies other than 
BOEM have limited ability to shape BOEM’s analysis of the impacts of 
oil and gas leasing programs, OCS lease sales, and other offshore oil and 
gas activities.251  NOAA, for example, has broad oceans expertise252 and 
should be an equal partner with BOEM in initial decisions about 
whether, when, and where to permit oil and gas activities on the OCS.  
Greater involvement by NOAA will help ensure that environmental 
analyses for OCS planning and leasing decisions include a proper range 
                                            
 250. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1). 
 251. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262 (noting that while BOEM must 
“consider” comments from other expert agencies, it is not obligated to respond to those 
comments or give them any particular weight). 
 252. See id. (describing NOAA as “the nation’s ocean agency with the most expertise 
in marine science and the management of living marine resources”). 
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of reasonable alternatives and assess accurately the environmental risks 
associated with oil and gas activities.  
Congress should amend OCSLA to give these other agencies a 
greater role in environmental analysis and decision making regarding 
OCS oil and gas activities.  For example, the National Commission 
recommended that Congress amend OCSLA “to provide NOAA with a 
formal consultative role during the development of the five-year lease 
plan and lease sale stages.”253   
In the absence of congressional action, BOEM should use its existing 
discretion to reach out to other federal agencies to initiate a more formal 
interagency consultation process for decisions relating to the planning 
and carrying out of OCS oil and gas activities.  The National 
Commission recommended that “NOAA and other federal agencies with 
appropriate expertise should be encouraged to act as cooperating 
agencies in NEPA reviews of offshore energy production activities, 
including exploration and development plans and drilling permit 
applications.”254  It also recommended that “[f]ederal agencies that 
submit comments to [BOEM] as part of a NEPA process should receive a 
written response indicating how the information was applied and if it was 
not included, why it was not included.”255 
BOEM has already taken a step toward greater cooperation with 
NOAA: on December 1, 2010, the BOEM Director, Michael R. 
Bromwich, announced that he was “in the process of completing an 
agreement with the [NOAA] through which NOAA will collaborate with 
[BOEM] in the environmental analyses for OCS planning.”256  BOEM 
should consider similar agreements with other expert agencies, including 
the EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.257  In addition, when 
reviewing spill response plans for OCS facilities, BOEM should seek to 
partner with the Coast Guard—the expert agency tasked with overseeing 
spill response for offshore facilities.258   
Finally, at every phase of the OCSLA process, BOEM and other 
federal agencies should solicit, consider, and incorporate local and 
                                            
 253. Id. at 264. 
 254. Id. at 265. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Salazar Announces Revised OCS 
Leasing Program: Key Modifications Based on Ongoing Reforms, Unparalleled Safety 
and Environmental Standards, and Rigorous Scientific Review para. 6 (Dec. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Announces-Revised-OCS-
Leasing-Program.cfm. 
 257. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262. 
 258. See supra Part II(B)(2) of this Article.  
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traditional knowledge from affected communities into the decision-
making process.   This would ensure that expert concerns are heard from 
the outset, and may help avoid later complications.  Affected states and 
local governments must also be partners in the preparation of NEPA 
analyses. 
2.  Narrowing the Geographic Scope of OCS Lease Sales 
As noted above, recent five-year oil and gas leasing programs and 
individual lease sales have included planning areas that are millions or 
tens of millions of acres in size.259  An environmental analysis of 
potential impacts on an area that is millions or tens of millions of acres in 
size cannot account adequately for the variability that exists across the 
planning area, nor can it anticipate adequately site-specific impacts.  The 
National Commission observed that “OCS lease sales cover such large 
geographic areas that meaningful NEPA review is difficult.”260  It 
recommended that planning areas included in OCS lease sales should be 
restricted to smaller geographic areas to promote more meaningful 
environmental analysis.261  
3.  Using “Tiering” Appropriately 
As discussed above, the OCSLA process is segmented into four 
distinct stages; these stages step down from a broad, national-level plan 
to a regional lease sale to a site-specific action, such as an exploration 
plan or development and production plan.262  It has also been  noted 
above that NEPA regulations encourage federal agencies to “tier” 
environmental analyses to avoid duplication and focus on critical 
issues.263  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed 
that BOEM “may issue a broader EIS at the earlier ‘need and site 
selection’ stage of a program, and issue subsequent, more detailed 
                                            
 259. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 260. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 261.   
 261. See id. (noting the expansive area of several recent OCS lease sales and observing 
that “it is appropriate to conduct environmental reviews on a finer geographic scale 
before private-sector commitments of this magnitude are made to purchase leases.”); cf. 
id. at 262 (recommending that BOEM reduce the size of lease sales “in less well explored 
areas,” so that the “geographic scope [of the lease sale] allows for a meaningful analysis 
of potential environmental impacts and identification of areas of ecological 
significance”). 
 262. See supra Part II(A)(1) – (4) of this Article. 
 263. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2010); see also id. § 1508.28 (defining “tiering”). 
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environmental impact statements at the program’s later, more site-
specific stage.”264  BOEM, however, has improperly exploited the 
segmented nature of the OCSLA process to avoid thorough NEPA 
analysis.  The National Commission determined that BOEM’s brand of 
tiering “created a system where deeper environmental analysis at more 
geographically targeted and advanced planning stages did not always 
take place.”265  Similarly, the Council on Environmental Quality 
observed that BOEM’s use of tiering “was not transparent . . . and has 
led to confusion and concern about whether environmental impacts were 
sufficiently evaluated and disclosed.”266  
In the Arctic, for example, BOEM prepared a nationwide, 
programmatic EIS for the original 2007 to 2012 OCS oil and gas leasing 
program.267  At the second stage of OCSLA, in support of Chukchi Sea 
Lease Sale 193, the agency prepared another broad EIS that purported to 
analyze potential environmental impacts for an area of about 34 million 
acres.268  At the third stage, when BOEM evaluated the potential 
environmental impacts of proposed exploration plans on leases sold in 
Lease Sale 193, the agency did not follow the path laid out by the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Instead of preparing a “more 
detailed environmental impact statement[ ]” at this “later, more site-
specific stage,” BOEM prepared less detailed EAs.269  In so doing, 
BOEM deprived itself and the public of a more rigorous environmental 
analysis, and deprived the public of the opportunity for meaningful 
comment. 
Going forward, BOEM must reform its implementation of NEPA to 
ensure that it analyzes adequately site-specific OCS oil and gas activities.  
The Council on Environmental Quality recommends that the agency 
“reexamine its NEPA implementation policies to ensure that its use of 
tiering is both clear and well-defined, and is not being used to limit site-
specific environmental analysis.”270  The National Commission 
recommends that BOEM develop a NEPA handbook that addresses the 
issue of tiering, and “provide[s] guidelines for applying NEPA in a 
                                            
 264. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28). 
 265. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 260. 
 266. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 3. 
 267. See generally 2007–2012 FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM FEIS, supra note 144.  
 268. See generally LEASE SALE 193 FEIS, supra note 144, at I-2. 
 269. See, e.g., 2009 BEAUFORT EA supra note 145; 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145. 
 270. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 23. 
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consistent, transparent, and appropriate manner to decisions affecting 
OCS oil and gas activities.”271 
4.  Eliminating the Use of Categorical Exclusions for OCS Drilling 
Activities 
Under NEPA regulations, categorical exclusions are appropriate only 
for those actions that “do not individually or cumulatively have a 
significant effect on the human environment.”272  BOEM, however, 
created categorical exclusions for actions that can and do have significant 
effects on the environment. 
For example, BOEM created a categorical exclusion for the 
“[a]pproval of an offshore lease or unit exploration[,] 
development/production plan[,] or a Development Operation 
Coordination Document in the central or western Gulf of Mexico.” 273  
The categorical exclusion was inapplicable to plans or documents that 
presented particularly high risks, such as facilities in areas that posed a 
“high seismic risk” or that used “new or unusual technology.”274  
Nonetheless, BOEM used the categorical exclusion to justify its decision 
to approve—without preparing an EA or EIS—BP’s plan to use an oil rig 
floating in nearly 5,000 feet of water to drill an exploration well that 
would penetrate roughly two-and-a-half miles below the seabed.275 
The impacts associated with even normal drilling operations include 
noise, air, and water pollution, as well as increased vessel and air 
traffic.276  When BP lost control of the Macondo well and the Deepwater 
Horizon burst into flames on April 20, 2010, it demonstrated graphically 
something that should have been obvious all along: all OCS drilling 
activities carry with them the potential for a catastrophic oil spill.  Given 
                                            
 271. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 261. 
 272. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010).   
 273. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., DEP’T OF INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 
§ 15.4(C)(10) (2004), available at 
http://elips.doi.gov/app_dm/act_getfiles.cfm?relnum=3625. 
 274. Id. 
 275. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 19–20; see also NATIONAL 
COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3 (noting water depth and depth of the formation targeted 
by the Macondo well). 
 276. See, e.g., 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145, at 29 (discussing noise generated 
by drilling equipment from proposed exploratory drilling); id. at 27 (discussing air 
emissions from proposed exploratory drilling); id. at 26 (noting that discharges from 
proposed exploration drilling would include “cement slurry, drainage waters, and 
domestic wastewaters”; id. at 22–25 (discussing air and vessel traffic associated with 
proposed exploratory drilling). 
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the actual and potential impacts of OCS drilling operations, it is 
unreasonable to assume—as BOEM did—that such operations do not 
have a significant effect on the human environment.  As a result, OCS 
drilling operations are not eligible to be categorically excluded from 
environmental review under NEPA.277  BOEM should revise its 
Department Manual to eliminate categorical exclusions for OCS drilling 
activities.  In the future, all OCS drilling activities should be subject to 
some level of site-specific NEPA analysis, either an EA or EIS.  
5.  Ensuring Appropriate Analysis of Low-Probability, High-Risk Events 
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted the risk of failing to 
engage in worst-case oil spill planning.  When making decisions that 
involve the potential for catastrophic result—such as a major oil spill—
BOEM’s environmental analyses must take seriously the potential for 
disaster; this is true even if the probability of such a disaster is low.278 
BOEM failed to analyze this type of low-probability, high-risk event 
when it prepared EAs for proposed exploration activities in the Beaufort 
and Chukchi seas.  BOEM’s EAs stated that “[a] very large spill from a 
well-control incident is not a reasonably foreseeable event in connection 
with the OCS exploration activities set forth in Shell’s 2010 exploration 
plan, and therefore, this EA does not analyze the impacts of such a 
worst-case scenario.”279  Instead of analyzing a potential blowout 
scenario, the EA for Shell’s exploration plan for the Chukchi Sea 
dismissed the possibility of a major spill and reviewed instead the effects 
of a small, 48-barrel fuel transfer spill.280  
In the future, BOEM must analyze low-probability, high-risk events 
to ensure that it is prepared for a worst-case disaster.  The Council on 
Environmental Quality concludes that, in light of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, BOEM must “take steps to incorporate catastrophic risk 
analysis.”281  Likewise, the National Commission recommends that 
BOEM “incorporate the ‘worst-case scenario’ calculations from industry 
                                            
 277. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010).   
 278. See, e.g., id. § 1502.22(b)(4) (noting that in a NEPA analysis when information is 
missing or unavailable, “reasonably foreseeable” impacts include “impacts which have 
catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that 
the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on 
pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason”). 
 279. 2009 BEAUFORT EA, supra note 145, at A-2; 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145, 
at A-2.  
 280. 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145, at 31-32. 
 281. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 27. 
312 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2 
 
oil spill response plans into NEPA documents and other environmental 
analyses or reviews” to inform the agency’s “estimates for potential oil 
spill situations in its environmental analyses.”282   
6.  Eliminating the Thirty-Day Deadline for Approval of Exploration 
Plans  
OCSLA requires BOEM to approve an exploration plan within thirty 
days of the date the exploration plan is submitted.283  The thirty-day 
requirement does not preclude BOEM from conducting a thorough 
environmental analysis, which might include the preparation of an EIS.  
BOEMRE could, for example, complete the NEPA analysis before it 
deems an exploration plan submitted.  Indeed, the National Commission 
recommends that BOEM not consider exploration plans “officially 
‘submitted’ until all of the required content, necessary environmental 
reviews, and other analyses are complete and adequate to provide a 
sound basis for decision-making.”284   
Nonetheless, OCSLA’s thirty-day requirement may tempt BOEM to 
rush its environmental analyses, or skip them altogether through the use 
of categorical exclusions.  Attempting to perform a NEPA analysis for an 
exploration plan in thirty days would likely result in an inadequate 
analysis and would certainly provide little opportunity for public review 
and comment.  As the National Commission suggests, “[i]f 
environmental review is to occur after plan submission, [the thirty-day] 
timetable effectively precludes the kind of exacting review necessary to 
ensure that [NEPA’s] environmental safeguards can be achieved.”285  
Congress should eliminate the thirty-day deadline under which BOEM 
must approve a “submitted” exploration plan to facilitate more rigorous 
NEPA analysis.286 
D.  Improving Agency Review of Oil Spill Response Plans and Promoting 
Better Oil Spill Cleanup Technology 
BOEM’s review of facility oil spill response plans fails to ensure that 
owners and operators will be able to respond effectively in the event of 
                                            
 282. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 267. 
 283. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006).   
 284. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262. 
 285. Id. at 80. 
 286. Cf. id. at 262 (recommending that Congress change OCSLA’s existing thirty-day 
deadline to a sixty-day deadline).   
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major oil spills.  In addition, current laws, regulations, and policies have 
failed to promote advances in oil spill cleanup technologies.   
1.  Improving Agency Review of Oil Spill Response Plans 
Oil spill response plans must be subject to more stringent review and 
analysis.  Existing law tasks BOEM with reviewing oil spill response 
plans for OCS facilities, but evidence suggests that the agency has not 
taken this responsibility seriously.287   
For example, BOEM apparently did not question the oil spill 
response plan that covered BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, 
even though that spill plan “identified three different worst-case 
scenarios that ranged from 28,033 to 250,000 barrels of oil discharge and 
used identical language to ‘analyze’ the shoreline impacts under each 
scenario.”288  The same spill plan also referenced walruses, sea lions, and 
sea otters—species that do not occur in the Gulf of Mexico.289  In the 
Arctic, BOEM approved an oil spill response plan in which Shell 
Offshore, Inc. claimed that it would recover 90 percent of the oil spilled 
during a worst case discharge from its proposed facility in the Beaufort 
Sea290—even though a 90 percent recovery rate is unquestionably 
unrealistic.  In earlier Arctic planning documents, BOEM acknowledged 
that “[o]n average, spill-response efforts result in recovery of 
approximately 10-20 % of the oil released to the ocean environment.”291  
And as noted earlier, despite the massive spill response effort that 
followed the Deepwater Horizon blowout, only one-third of the oil that 
was discharged from the Macondo well was recovered or treated with 
                                            
 287. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 84 (concluding that BOEM did 
not “evidence[ ] serious attention to detail” when it approved the spill plan that was 
applicable to BP’s Macondo well, and noting that at least four other oil spill response 
plans for OCS facilities in the Gulf of Mexico contained the same error).  
 288. Id. at 84. 
 289. BP, REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN – GULF OF MEXICO § 11 fig. 11-3 (2009); 
see also NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 84 (noting that the spill plan “described 
biological resources nonexistent in the Gulf [of Mexico]”). 
 290. See SHELL OFFSHORE INC., BEAUFORT SEA REGIONAL EXPLORATION OIL 
DISCHARGE PREVENTION AND CONTINGENCY PLAN 1-29 (2010), available at 
http://alaska.boemre.gov/fo/ODPCPs/2010_Beaufort_cplan.pdf.  
 (assuming that only 10 percent of the discharge from a hypothetical blowout will 
“escape[ ] primary offshore recovery efforts”); id. at unmarked page following I-12 
(containing BOEM approval letter). 
 291. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BEAUFORT 
SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 186, 195, AND 202, IV-17 (2003), 
available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIA_EA/2003_001.pdf. 
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dispersants.292  This kind of uncritical review led DOI’s Office of 
Inspector General to conclude that BOEM’s review of oil spill response 
plans “does not ensure that critical data are correct.”293  
To facilitate more serious review of oil spill response plans for 
offshore facilities, broaden the scope of review, and promote better 
information sharing among federal agencies involved in spill response 
efforts—including the Coast Guard, NOAA, and EPA—Congress should 
require multiple federal agencies to review and approve these plans.  In 
the absence of Congressional action, DOI should work with other 
agencies to establish formal mechanisms for interagency review of oil 
spill response plans.294  The National Commission endorsed the idea of 
interagency spill plan review:  
In addition to the Department of the Interior, other agencies with 
relevant scientific and operational expertise should play a role in 
evaluating spill response plans to verify that operators can 
conduct the response and containment operations detailed in 
their plans. Specifically, oil spill response plans, including 
source-control measures, should be subject to interagency review 
and approval by the Coast Guard, EPA, and NOAA. Other parts 
of the federal government, such as Department of Energy 
national laboratories that possess relevant scientific expertise, 
could be consulted.295   
The National Commission also noted that interagency review of oil 
spill response plans for OCS facilities would facilitate greater integration 
of those plans with broader-level area contingency plans and regional 
contingency plans because it would  “involv[e] the agencies with primary 
responsibility for government spill response planning in oversight of 
industry planning.”296   
In addition to interagency review of oil spill response plans for OCS 
facilities, BOEM should allow for public comment on such plans: “Plans 
should also be made available for a public comment period prior to final 
                                            
 292. LUBCHENCO ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. 
 293. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 44.   
 294. For example, the DOI Inspector General Report recommended that DOI “[d]raft a 
new Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard, EPA, and other interested 
agencies, requiring appropriate participation of all parties in the review of [oil spill 
response plans] and any related drills or exercises.”  Id. at 49.  Such an approach would 
not require Congressional action.  
 295. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 266-67. 
 296. Id. at 267. 
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approval and response plans should be made available to the public 
following their approval.”297  
2.  Promoting Advances in Oil Spill Response Technologies 
Current technologies for removing spilled oil are much the same 
today as they were over twenty years ago, at the time of the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill.  This is not particularly surprising.  As the National 
Commission pointed out, “neither industry nor government has made 
significant investments in improving the menu of response options or 
significantly improved their effectiveness.”298   
To ensure that research and development of oil spill response 
technologies is not put off until the next catastrophic spill, Congress 
should provide steady funding for federal agencies to promote and 
conduct such research.  The National Commission recommended that 
Congress establish a funding mechanism that is not subject to the annual 
appropriations process to “increase federal funding for oil spill response 
research by agencies such as [DOI], the Coast Guard, EPA, and 
NOAA—including NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration.”299  In 
addition, agencies may be able to increase their own focus on spill 
response research.  For example, the DOI Inspector General 
recommended that DOI “[c]onduct additional research on containment 
and control measures to determine appropriate requirements for 
containing oil discharge at the source.”300  As noted above, agencies can 
also promote industry investment in oil spill response research and 
development by instituting strict new performance standards that require 
operators of OCS facilities to demonstrate the effectiveness of their spill 
response equipment in real-world conditions before they are allowed to 
conduct drilling activities.301 
E.  The Need For Multi-Sector Planning: Integrating OCS Oil and Gas 
Activities with Other Ocean Uses 
OCSLA is a single-sector statute that focuses almost exclusively on 
oil and gas activities.  Unsurprisingly, BOEM’s implementation of 
OCSLA has shared that narrow focus.  Under the existing framework, 
                                            
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 269. 
 299. Id. at 270. 
 300. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 51. 
 301. See supra Part IV(B)(3). 
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BOEM has viewed the ocean through an oil-and-gas lens.  Its decisions 
about offshore oil and gas activities—which may affect broad areas of 
the ocean and impact other sectors of the economy302—have not been 
integrated with decisions about other ocean uses.  The result has been 
fragmented and inefficient management, and a failure to prioritize the 
health of ocean and coastal ecosystems.  In the future, federal decisions 
about OCS oil and gas activities should be incorporated into a 
comprehensive framework that promotes integrated planning and 
management.  In addition, Congress should establish a permanently 
appropriated, dedicated funding source for ocean and coastal 
conservation and management. 
1.  Multi-Sector Planning 
In July 2010, President Obama established the National Ocean 
Council, an interagency body charged with providing direction to federal 
agencies to ensure that those agencies implement the National Ocean 
Policy and related objectives.303  The Council will also organize regional 
coastal and marine spatial planning processes designed to foster “a more 
integrated, comprehensive, ecosystem-based, flexible, and proactive 
approach to planning and managing sustainable multiple uses across 
sectors and improve the conservation of the ocean, our coasts, and the 
Great Lakes.”304   
The Secretary of the Interior, as a member of the National Ocean 
Council,305 should ensure that BOEM and other relevant agencies within 
DOI are active participants in National Ocean Council processes.  Other 
federal agencies involved in the planning and management of OCS oil 
and gas activities should participate fully, as well.  Participation in 
interagency National Ocean Council processes will facilitate improved 
communication and coordination among different agencies with respect 
to decisions about oil and gas activities.   
                                            
 302. For example, the Deepwater Horizon disaster led NOAA to institute fishery 
closures that, at their maximum, prohibited commercial fishing of more than one-third of 
the Gulf of Mexico’s exclusive economic zone.  See NOAA FISHERIES SERV., SOUTHEAST 
REGIONAL OFFICE, DEEPWATER HORIZON/BP OIL SPILL: SIZE AND PERCENT COVERAGE OF 
FISHING AREA CLOSURES DUE TO BP OIL SPILL, 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 
2011). 
 303. See Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, 43,025 (July 22, 2010).   
 304. Id. at 43,023. 
 305. Id. at 43,024. 
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The involvement of BOEM and other federal agencies in regional 
coastal and marine spatial planning processes—required by Executive 
Order 13,547306—could be especially valuable.  Coastal and marine 
spatial planning will involve the assembly and synthesis of scientific 
data, which will promote better understanding of marine and coastal 
ecosystems and facilitate science-based management.307  The coastal and 
marine spatial planning process will also help identify in advance 
potential conflicts among different sectors or stakeholders, helping to 
promote smarter, better-coordinated use of the ocean.308  The National 
Commission concluded that “[i]ntegrating five-year [OCS] leasing plans 
and associated leasing decisions with the coastal and marine spatial 
planning process will be an important step toward assuring the 
sustainable use of ocean and coastal ecosystems.”309   
2.  Funding for Ocean Conservation and Management 
Ocean and coastal ecosystems are already under stress from 
overexploitation, habitat degradation, coastal and marine pollution, 
climate change, and ocean acidification.  In the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster was another blow to an already-degraded 
ocean environment.310  To address the significant threats to the health of 
these ecosystems, Congress should establish a permanently appropriated, 
dedicated funding source for ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes 
conservation and management.  Given the risks posed by OCS oil and 
gas activities, a portion of the revenue generated from those activities 
should be directed to a fund to support ocean protection, maintenance, 
                                            
 306. Id. at 43,026.   
 307. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 66 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf (noting that scientific 
knowledge and data are essential to coastal and marine spatial planning); id. at 68-69 
(explaining that the coastal and marine spatial planning process would develop “science-
based decision-support tools, including models, assessments, and visualization 
capabilities,” to facilitate marine and coastal planning and “synthesize information most 
relevant” to decision-makers.).  
 308. See id. at 48 (noting that one principle of coastal and marine spatial planning is to 
manage multiple existing and emerging uses “in a manner that reduces conflict, enhances 
compatibility among uses and with sustained ecosystem functions and services, provides 
for public access, and increases certainty and predictability for economic investments.”).  
 309. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 263. 
 310. See Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313, 62,313 (Oct. 8, 2010) 
(observing that the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem had suffered a “longstanding ecological 
decline” even before the Deepwater Horizon disaster).  
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and restoration—including research and monitoring, such as ocean 
observing systems.  Specifically, Congress should create a trust fund 
capitalized annually at a minimum of ten percent of revenues derived 
from offshore oil and gas energy development. The fund should be used 
to finance activities and projects that satisfy criteria designed to ensure 
that they benefit protection, maintenance, and restoration of marine 
ecosystem health. 
V.  NEW FRONTIERS: PROTECTING ARCTIC MARINE ECOSYSTEMS FROM 
AN EXPANSION OF OCS OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES 
Although the Gulf of Mexico region has produced the vast majority 
of OCS oil and gas to date,311 the Beaufort and Chukchi seas off the coast 
of Alaska’s North Slope may be the next frontier in OCS oil and gas 
exploration, due to “the likelihood of finding significant new sources of 
oil” in the region.312  The reforms described above will improve 
governance of OCS oil and gas activities no matter where they take 
place.  However, OCS operations in remote Arctic waters pose increased 
challenges and risks that require special consideration.  As the National 
Commission noted, “[i]n the near term, the Alaskan frontier is likely to 
attract the greatest attention, and to require the closest scrutiny, given the 
potential energy resources and the physical and environmental challenges 
of pursuing them safely.”313   
This Part briefly describes the Arctic environment, the people and 
wildlife that call it home, and the risks and challenges associated with 
conducting OCS oil and gas operations in that environment.   It also 
advocates a suite of measures necessary to promote informed decision-
making and safer operations in the Arctic.  
A.  Arctic Environment, People, and Wildlife 
The Arctic OCS is a severe environment.  Temperatures are below 
freezing for most of the year, and winter temperatures at Prudhoe Bay on 
                                            
 311. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS: COMPREHENSIVE 
INVENTORY OF U.S. OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESOURCES, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 
2005—SECTION 357, vii (2006), available at 
http://www.boemre.gov/revaldiv/PDFs/FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongress-
corrected3-6-06.pdf (showing a cumulative production of oil from the Gulf of Mexico 
OCS of 13.05 billion barrels of oil, while cumulative production from the rest of the OCS 
combined was less than 1.1 billion barrels of oil). 
 312. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 301. 
 313. Id.  
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the Beaufort Sea have plunged below -60 ºF.314  Although the Beaufort 
and Chukchi seas do not receive a great deal of precipitation, they are 
subject to fog, rain, and snowstorms that can limit visibility.315  From 
June to August, fog is common, and there are low visibility conditions on 
the open sea 25-50 percent of the time.316  The Beaufort and Chukchi 
seas are also subject to fierce storms, some of which can last for two 
weeks at a time.317  Some storms have produced sustained winds of 
seventy-five miles per hour and reported wind gusts close to 100 miles 
per hour.318  Unlike other areas of the OCS, the Beaufort and Chukchi 
seas are characterized by seasonal sea ice.  Sea ice usually reaches its 
maximum extent in March, and melts back to its minimum extent in 
September.319  Sea ice is a dynamic environment; pack ice shifts and 
moves with winds and currents and varies in time and place.320 
The Arctic environment has been home to human communities for 
thousands of years.321  Many Arctic residents depend on healthy marine 
ecosystems to support their subsistence way of life.322  Some coastal 
villages hunt limited numbers of bowhead whales in the Beaufort or 
Chukchi seas, and the whale hunt is central to their culture.323  Arctic 
peoples may also depend on fish, walruses, seals, and/or seabirds to 
support their subsistence way of life.324  For many people who live in the 
villages along the Beaufort and Chukchi coasts, continued health of 
marine ecosystems is tied directly to the continued health of their food 
supply and culture.325   
                                            
 314. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
BEAUFORT SEA AND CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREAS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 209, 212, 
217, AND 221,  3-13 (2008), available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS%20EA/ 
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In addition to the humans who call the Arctic home, the Beaufort and 
Chukchi seas support some of the world’s most iconic wildlife species.  
These waters are home to an array of marine mammals including 
bowhead, gray, and beluga whales; Pacific walrus; spotted, bearded, 
ribbon, and ringed seals; and polar bears.326  The Arctic also hosts 
migratory wildlife such as gray, humpback, minke, and killer whales, and 
millions of seabirds, shorebirds, and waterfowl; these species come in the 
summer to breed, feed, and rear their young.327  The Arctic supports a 
number of important lower trophic level species, as well.  Arctic cod, for 
example, are a particularly important part of the Arctic marine food 
web.328   
B.  Challenges to OCS Oil and Gas Activity in the Arctic 
Environmental conditions present challenges for oil and gas 
companies that seek to operate in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.  
Working conditions in the region are affected by “extreme cold, 
extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength storms, and pervasive 
fog.”329   In addition, “[t]he Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are covered by 
varying forms of ice for eight to nine months a year,” which “limit[s] 
exploratory drilling and many other activities to the summer months.”330 
The physical conditions of the Arctic also pose challenges for oil 
spill response operations.  For example, “serious questions remain about 
how to access spilled oil when the [sea] is iced over or in seasonal slushy 
conditions.”331  Mechanical recovery equipment—such as vessels using 
skimmers and boom—would likely operate at much lower efficiencies in 
the icy waters of the Arctic than in more temperate waters.332  In-situ 
burning may be difficult in slush or “grease” ice conditions, or in certain 
concentrations of ice.333  “[T]he general consensus in the spill response 
                                            
 326. Id. at 162–175.   
 327. Id. at 142–50; 164–67.   
 328. See id. at 85 (noting that research indicates “that Arctic cod is a crucial link 
between the sea ice food web and arctic marine mammals and birds”); see also id. at 201 
(“Arctic cod is considered a keystone species in the Arctic ecosystem.”).   
 329. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302. 
 330. Id.  
 331. Id.  
 332. PEW ENVTL. GROUP, OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC 
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community is that dispersants are not a proven technology for use in 
most sea ice conditions.”334  Because oil will be slower to weather in cold 
Arctic temperatures, it likely “would linger much longer in the marine 
environment.”335   
Lack of infrastructure to support a large spill response is another 
factor in the Arctic. The eight main communities of Alaska’s North 
Slope are not connected by road; there are relatively few docks and 
airstrips; the nearest major port is in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, about 1,300 
nautical miles from Point Barrow; and the nearest Coast Guard air station 
is approximately 950 miles away in Kodiak, Alaska.336  The National 
Commission noted that “industry and support infrastructures are least 
developed, or absent” in the Arctic OCS.337 
Another limitation on OCS oil and gas operations in the Arctic is a 
lack of baseline scientific information necessary to make informed 
planning and management decisions for the region.  Such information is 
especially critical because the Arctic’s physical and ecological systems 
are in flux due to climate change.338    The National Commission 
observed that “scientific research on the ecosystems of the Arctic is 
difficult and expensive. Good information exists for only a few species, 
and even for those, just for certain times of the year or in certain 
areas.”339   It also determined that “detailed geological and environmental 
information does not exist for the Arctic exploration areas” in the same 
way that it does for the Gulf of Mexico or even the Atlantic.340  For 
example, a recent BOEM analysis cataloged all the statements in an EIS 
prepared for an oil and gas lease sale in the Chukchi Sea “that 
acknowledged incomplete or unavailable information.”341  The catalog of 
                                            
 334. Id. at 82. 
 335. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302. 
 336. PEW ENVTL. GROUP, supra note 332, at 22–23.   
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missing information was 140 pages long.342  Recognizing the need for 
additional scientific information about the Arctic OCS, Secretary Salazar 
directed the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct “a special review of 
information that is known” and to summarize “what knowledge gaps 
may exist regarding environmental sensitivities, including impending 
climate change, and other factors that would be considered in decisions 
about potential future development” in the Arctic OCS.343   
C.  Additional Measures Needed to Safeguard Arctic Ecosystems 
Although the Arctic OCS will benefit from the general OCS reforms 
described in Part IV of this Article, additional measures are needed to 
ensure that Arctic drilling—if it is allowed to proceed—is conducted 
with “utmost care.”344 
First, decision-makers must have access to more comprehensive 
scientific information about the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.  The U.S. 
Geological Survey study noted above will be a good first step toward 
identifying knowledge gaps.  However, because of the limited nature of 
the U.S. Geological Survey study, a more comprehensive scientific gap 
analysis, performed by an independent entity outside DOI, may be 
necessary.345  Beyond that, a long-term scientific research and monitoring 
program is needed to begin the process of filling knowledge gaps.  The 
                                                                                                  
available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS%20EA/2010_034.pdf.  BOEM undertook 
this analysis because the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska determined that the 
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Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1019 (D. Alaska 2010). 
 342. See generally DRAFT SEIS LEASE SALE 193, supra note 341, App. A. 
 343. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies 
Initiative that will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, paras. 3-
4 (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_ 
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 344. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302 (observing that conducting OCS 
oil and gas operations in “offshore Arctic Alaska requires the utmost care, given the 
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to assess existing scientific information and identify any relevant additional information 
to ensure adequate environmental review of proposed industrial activities in the region.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at 98–99 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 
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National Commission, for example, “recommend[ed] an immediate, 
comprehensive federal research effort to provide a foundation of 
scientific information on the Arctic.”346   According to the Commission, 
such an effort should produce results  
capable of informing decision-making related to oil and gas 
leasing, exploration, and development and production in the 
Arctic; measuring and monitoring impacts of oil and gas 
development on Arctic ecological resources; natural resource 
damage assessment should an oil spill occur[;] and protocols 
in any treaty negotiated among the Arctic nations.347 
Second, the federal government must develop oil spill response 
measures that are specific to the Arctic environment.  As noted above in 
Parts IV(B)(3) and IV(D), government regulators should introduce 
substantive, enforceable performance standards for oil spill response, 
promote interagency review of oil spill response plans, and support the 
development of better cleanup technologies.  In doing so, regulators must 
address the unique environmental conditions of the Arctic OCS.  
Congress or BOEM should implement Arctic-specific spill-response 
standards to ensure that spill response technologies will work effectively 
in icy waters, and that there is adequate infrastructure and Coast Guard 
presence in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas to support response efforts in 
the event of a catastrophic spill.  For example, the National Commission 
recommended that before BOEM makes a determination that drilling in a 
particular area of the Arctic is appropriate, (1) the agency should ensure 
that industry containment and response plans are adequate; (2) the Coast 
Guard and oil companies in the region should coordinate carefully and 
build and deploy the necessary capabilities; and (3) Congress should 
fund an expansion of Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic.348   
Third, management of activities on the Arctic OCS must be better 
coordinated and must place a greater emphasis on protecting the health 
of Arctic marine ecosystems.  One of the National Ocean Council’s 
(NOC) national priority objectives is addressing “environmental 
stewardship needs in the Arctic Ocean and adjacent coastal areas in the 
face of climate-induced and other environmental changes.”349  To help 
attain this objective, the NOC is in the process of preparing a strategic 
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action plan for the Arctic.350  In drafting the Arctic strategic action plan, 
the NOC should prioritize protection of Arctic marine ecosystems and 
emphasize science-based decision-making; it should take a precautionary 
approach toward oil and gas activities in Arctic waters.  As members of 
the NOC,351 DOI, NOAA, the Coast Guard, EPA, and other federal 
agencies should work together to ensure that the strategic action plan 
addresses issues related to potential impacts of oil and gas activities in 
the Arctic, including the potential for oil spills in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi seas.  When coastal and marine spatial planning efforts get 
underway in the Arctic, these agencies should engage proactively.352 
Fourth, BOEM should prepare updated, comprehensive NEPA 
analyses and oil spill response plans for proposed oil and gas activities in 
the Arctic.  It is not appropriate to rely on NEPA analyses prepared prior 
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  As the CEQ observed:  
[t]he BP Oil Spill constitutes significant new information and 
circumstances that may require reevaluation of some conclusions 
reached in prior NEPA reviews and other environmental 
analyses and studies. Specifically, conclusions may change about 
the likelihood, magnitude, and environmental impacts of a major 
spill in connection with OCS oil and gas drilling activities.353 
As a result, before deciding whether to authorize exploration drilling 
in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas, BOEM must require potential OCS 
operators to submit new exploration plans.  To evaluate the potential 
impacts of those exploration plans, BOEM should prepare 
comprehensive EISs, based on the latest information, including 
information revealed by investigations of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, the U.S. Geological Survey’s review of Arctic science, and 
other sources. 
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Although implementing them will take some time, the foregoing 
measures will help decision-makers make informed choices about 
whether to allow oil and gas operations in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas.  
If oil and gas activities do proceed, these measures will reduce the risk of 
a catastrophic oil spill in vulnerable Arctic waters. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Deepwater Horizon blowout was a tragedy that took the lives of 
eleven people and led to a marine oil spill of unprecedented size.  The 
disaster caused acute and ongoing injury to the people, wildlife, and 
economy of the Gulf of Mexico, and rightly triggered a reassessment of 
the nation’s oversight of OCS oil and gas activities.  A series of 
investigations and studies—some still in progress—researched what 
went wrong and why it went wrong, and developed recommendations for 
improvement.  The 111th Congress developed comprehensive legislation 
designed to address shortcomings in the laws that govern offshore oil and 
gas activities, but in the end, failed to pass that legislation.  DOI has 
taken many steps to reform its internal structure and improve safety and 
oversight, but as the National Commission observed, “[t]o assure human 
safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing, 
energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those 
significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.”354   
Meaningful reform will require an OCS policy that prioritizes the 
protection of ecosystem health; substantive, enforceable standards 
designed to achieve that protection; improved coordination among 
agencies; and better processes for evaluating potential environmental 
risks and spill response capabilities.  It will also require a willingness to 
look beyond the oil and gas sector, and to implement practices that 
facilitate integrated, coordinated, multi-sector planning and management 
processes designed to help ensure protection, maintenance, and 
restoration of ocean and coastal ecosystems. 
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